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THE HEALTH CARE AGENT:
PROTECTING THE CHOICES AND INTERESTS
OF PATIENTS WHO LACK CAPACITY
Robert N. Swidler, MA., JD.*
In New York, adults with decisional capacity enjoy a firmly-established right to decide whether to consent to or refuse
medical treatment, including life-sustaining treatment.' At the same
time, most New Yorkers have little assurance, if they lose capacity,
that their wishes about treatment will be honored.2 Nor can they be
* Staff Counsel, New York State Task Force on Life & the Law. Mr. Swidler is also coauthor, with Tracy E. Miller, of Legislative Initiatives on Life-Sustaining Treatment: The DoNot-Resuscitate Law and Health CareProxy Proposal,N.Y.S. BAR J. 30 (Feb. 1989) and author
of The Presumption of Consent in New York State's Do-Not-Resuscitate Law, N.Y.S. MED. J.
69 (Feb. 1989). J.D., Columbia University, 1982; M.A., State University of New York at
Binghamton, 1978; B.A., State University of New York at Binghamton, 1977.
1. See notes 12-17 and accompanying text. The term "capacity" is used instead of
"competence" because (i) it relates to the ability to perform a particular function -- in this
instance making health care decisions -- as opposed to the general ability to manage one's
own affairs; and (ii) "incapacity," unlike "incompetence," does not suggest an adjudicated
status. See UNITED STATES OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, LIFE-SUSTAINING TECH.
NOLOGIES AND THE ELDERLY 122-26 (1987); NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND
THE LAW LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT. MAKING DECISIONS AND APPOINTING A HEALTH
CARE AGENT 100-104 (1987)(hereinafter APPOINTING A HEALTH CARE AGENT]. Cf. Rivers v.

Katz, 67 N.Y.2d 485, 492-98, 495 N.E.2d 337, 341-42, 504 N.Y.S.2d 74, 78-81 (1986) (holding
that patients who have "capacity" have right to refuse treatment, and requiring a judicial
determination of incapacity to override a patient's objection to treatment). This article does
not address legal and medical issues relating to determining patient incapacity.
2. See infra notes 18-36 and accompanying text.
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confident that someone close to them will be permitted to weigh the
expected benefits and burdens of a proposed treatment and make
a reasoned
judgment about whether the treatment serves their best
3
interests.
Increasingly, legislatures, courts, and commentators throughout
the nation are concluding that adults can best protect their health
care choices and interests by creating a durable power of attorney
for health care 4 or, in the terminology of a current New York
proposal, a "health care proxy."' An adult could use such document
to formally appoint an attorney-in-fact, or "health care agent," who
could make decisions on behalf of the adult in the event he or she
loses the ability to make decisions personally.
This article discusses a major current legislative proposal,
advanced by the New York State Task Force on Life and the Law,
governing the appointment of health care agents.6 The proposal, if
enacted, would unequivocally establish an adult's right to appoint a
health care agent, obligate health care providers to honor such
appointments, protect them from liability for doing so, and implement special rules and safeguards beyond those afforded by ordinary
agency principles.

I.BACKGROUND
In December 1984, Governor Cuomo created the New York
State Task Force on Life and the Law, and directed it to study and
make policy recommendations on legal and ethical issues raised by
new medical technologies.7 Its twenty-six members include prominent
physicians, nurses, lawyers, academics, and clergymen of different
faiths.' The Task Force's Chairman is Dr. David Axelrod, the State
3. See infra notes 136-47 and accompanying text.
4. See infra 13-38.
5. APPOINTING A HEALTH CARE AGENT, supra note 1, at 80-81.
6. The proposal is set forth in an Appendix to this article.
7. Executive Order No. 56, Dec. 20, 1984. See Severo, Cuomo Appoints 23 to Study Issues
in Medical Technology, N.Y. Times, Dec. 23, 1984, § I at 22, col. 1.
8. APPOINTING A HEALTH CARE AGENT, supra note 1 (list of Task Force members).

1988]

HEALTH CARE AGENTS

Health Commissioner.9 The Task Force has issued reports on brain
death, New York's Required Request Law, do not resuscitate orders,
health care agent appointment, organ transplantation, fetal
extrauterine survivability, and surrogate parenting."
In July 1987, after over a year of study and discussion, the Task
Force issued a report on the decisions by adults to forgo treatment,
both directly and by advance directive." The first half of the report
addresses the ethical, legal, and social aspects of such decisions. The
Task Force's analysis of the law reveals the particular difficulties
faced by New Yorkers who are concerned about the use of medical
technologies toward the end of life.
New York law has long recognized the right of decision-capable
adults to decide about their own health care. That right encompasses the right to forgo life-sustaining treatment, 3 including artificial
nutrition and hydration. 4 Although broad, the right to refuse
9. Id.
10. THE DETERMINATION OF DEATH (1986); THE REQUIRED REQUEST LAw (1986); Do
NOT RESUSCITATE ORDERS: THE PROPOSED LEGISLATION AND REPORT OF THE NEW YORK
STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW (1986); APPOINTING A HEALTH CARE AGENT,
supra note 1; TRANSPLANTATION IN NEW YORK STATE: THE PROCUREMENT AND DISTRIBTION
OF ORGANS AND TISSUES (1988); FETAL EXTRAUTERINE SURVIVABILITY (1988)(Report from

a Subcommittee to the Task Force); SURROGATE PARENTING: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY (1988).
11. APPOINTING A HEALTH CARE AGENT, supra note 1. See Sullivan, New York Panel
Urges Widening Patients' Rights, N.Y. Times, Sept. 30, 1987, at Al, col. 2.
12. Based primarily on the common law principle of bodily self-determination, Eichner
v. Dillon, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 377, 420 N.E.2d 64, 68, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 273 cern denied, 454 U.S.
858 (1981); Schloendorff v. Soc'y of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129-30, 105 N.E. 92, 96
(1914); the right is also supported in New York by the due process clause of the state
constitution, Rivers v. Katz, 67 N.Y.2d 485, 492, 495 N.E.2d 337, 504 N.Y.S.2d 74, 78 (1986),
and by statutes and regulations. E.g, N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 2805-d, 2803-c(3)(a)
(McKinney 1978); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. X §§ 405.25(a)(7), 414.14(a)(4) (1987).
13. Eichner, 52 N.Y.2d at 377, 420 N.E.2d at 68, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 273.
14. In re O'Connor, 139 A.D.2d 344, 532 N.Y.S.2d 133, 135 (2d Dep't 1988), rev'dl on
other grounds, 72 N.Y.2d 517, 531 N.E.2d 607, 534 N.Y.S.2d 886 (1988); Delio v. Westchester
County Medical Center, 129 A.D.2d 1, 516 N.Y.S.2d 677, 691 (2d Dep't 1987). See also Gray
v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580, 586-87 (D.R.I. 1988); In re Gardner, 534 A.2d 947, 954-55 (Me.
1987); 452-55 (1987); Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., 398 Mass. 417, 434-39, 497 N.E.2d
626, 635-38 (1986); In re Conroy, 98 NJ. 321, 350-51, 486 A.2d 1209, 1239-37 (1985).
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treatment is not absolute." For example, the state's interest in
protecting third parties has been found sufficiently compelling to
override treatment refusals by competent patients in cases in which
the patient was pregnant1 6 or responsible for the support of minor
children."
However, an adult's right to decide about life-sustaining
treatment is undermined if the adult loses decisional capacity, as
commonly occurs in the course of a terminal illness. This problem
stems in part from Eichner v. Dillon and Matter of Storar, two cases
jointly decided by the New York State Court of Appeals in 1981.8
In Eichner, the court held that treatment can be withdrawn
from a patient when there is "clear and convincing evidence" that
the patient would want it withdrawn." The patient in that case,
Brother Fox, previously stated that he would not want his life
prolonged by extraordinary measures if his condition was hopeless.2"
15.
Courts in New York and elsewhere typically recite four state interests that could,
under some circumstances, override a patient's right to refuse treatment: (i) preservation of
life; (ii) prevention of suicide; (iii) protection of third persons; and (iv) maintenance of the
integrity of the medical profession. Eg., Delio, 129 A.D. 2d at 23, 516 N.Y.S.2d at 691. See
also In re Farrell, 108 NJ. 335, 341, 529 A.2d 404, 410-11 (1987); Brophy, 398 Mass. at 432,
497 N.E.2d at 634.
16. Most such cases involve refusals of blood transfusions by pregnant women who are
Jehovah's Witnesses. E.g, In re Jamaica Hosp., 128 Misc. 2d 1006, 491 N.Y.S.2d 898 (Sup.
Ct. 1985)(blood transfusion ordered, over mother's objection, to save life of fetus); Crouse
Irving Memorial Hosp. v. Paddock, 127 Misc. 2d 101, 485 N.Y.S.2d 443 (Sup. Ct. 1985)(blood
transfusion ordered, over mother's objection, to safeguard baby's life and health during
cesarean delivery). See also Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J.
421, 201 A.2d 537, cert denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964). A recent District of Columbia case
involved a terminally ill pregnant woman. In re A.C., 533 A-2d 611 (D.C. Ct. App. 1987) reh'g
granted en banc 539 A.2d 203 (D.C. Ct. App. 1988).
17. In re Winthrop Univ. Hosp., 128 Misc. 2d 804, 490 N.Y.S.2d 996 (Sup. Ct. 1985).
However, the state's interest in protecting children has been deemed satisfied where there is
a surviving parent. In re Fosmire, 144 A.D.2d 8, 536 N.Y.S.2d 492 (2d Dep't 1989); Randolph
v. City of N.Y., 117 A.D.2d 44, 501 N.Y.S.2d 837 (1st Dep't 1986). See also, United States
v. George, 239 F. Supp. 752 (D. Conn. 1965)(overriding treatment refusal of children by
Jehovah's Witness mother); Application of President and Directors of Georgetown College,
Inc., 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1964) reh'g denied, 331 F.2d 1010 (D.C. Cir. 1964) cert. denied,
377 U.S. 978 (1964).
18. In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981), cert denied,
454 U.S. 858 (1981). See ApPOINTINo A HEALTH CARE AGENT, supra note 1, at 26-27.
19. Eichner, 52 N.Y.2d at 378-80, 420 N.E.2d at 67-68, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 274.
20. Eichner, 52 N.Y.2d at 371-72, 420 N.E.2d at 68, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 270.
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The court found that Brother Fox's oral statements constituted clear
and convincing evidence that he did not want to be maintained in
a vegetative coma by a mechanical respirator."1 In so holding, the
court emphasized that it was not permitting someone else to decide
on behalf of Brother Fox to discontinue treatment, but was instead
giving effect to the decision that Brother Fox had made for himself
before he became incompetent.'
The companion case, Matter of Storar, involved a 52 year old
man, John Storar, who had been retarded since birth.' Storar was
dying of bladder cancer and was receiving frequent transfusions to
replace blood lost from an inoperable bladder lesion.' His mother
sought to stop the transfusions because Storar found them painful
and disturbing, and because they would at best extend his life by
three to six months.' Although two lower courts supported the
mother's decision,' the Court of Appeals overruled them and
ordered the transfusions to continue. It explained that John Storar,
unlike Brother Fox, never chose to forgo life-sustaining treatment;
indeed, he had never been capable of making such a decision. 7 The
Court acknowledged that the mother had Storar's best interests in
mind, but said it could not "allow an incompetent patient to bleed
to death because someone, even someone as close as a parent or
sibling, feels that this is best for one with an incurable disease. '
Viewed together, Eichner and Storar authorize the withdrawal
or withholding of life-sustaining treatment from a patient who lacks
capacity only if there is clear and convincing evidence that the
patient would not want to receive life-sustaining treatment. When
such evidence is not present, no one -- not the patient's family,
physician, committee, conservator, guardian, not even a court -- can
21. Id. at 378-80, 420 N.E.2d at 72, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 274.
22. Id. at 378, 420 N.E.2d at 67, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 274.
23. Storar, 52 N.Y.2d at 373, 420 N.E.2d at 68, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 270.
24. Id. at 373-74, 420 N.E.2d at 68-69, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 270-71.
25. Id. at 373-76, 420 N.E.2d at 72-74, 438 N.Y.2d at 270-72.
26. Storar, 106 Misc. 2d 880, 433 N.Y.S.2d 388 (Sup. Ct. 1980); aff'd, 78 A.D.2d 1013,
434 N.Y.S.2d 46 (4th Dep't 1980).
27. Storar, 52 N.Y.2d at 380, 420 N.E.2d at 72-73, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 274-75.
28. Id. at 382, 420 N.E.2d at 72, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 275.
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authorize the discontinuance of life-sustaining treatment on the

patient's behalf. In this respect, New York law differs from that of
most other jurisdictions, which -- either by statute 9 or court
decision" -- recognize the authority of a patient's family or others,
29. Eleven states have provisions in living will statutes that specifically empower family
members to direct the withdrawal or withholding of life-sustaining treatment from patients
under limited circumstances. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 20-17-214 (Supp. 1987); CONN. GEN STAT.
§ 19a-571 (West Supp. 1988); FA. STAT. ANN. § 765.01 (West 1986); IOWA CODE ANN. §
144A.7 (West 1988); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.58.5 (West Supp. 1989); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 24-7-8.1 (1986); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-320 (1985); OR. REV. STAT. § 97.083 (1985);
TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4590h.4C (Vernon Supp. 1989); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-1107
(Supp. 1988); VA. CODE § 54.1-2986 (1988). The District of Columbia recently enacted a
surrogate decision-making statute that expressly empowers family members to decide about
life-sustaining treatment. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 21-2201 - 2213 (Supp. 1989). See also
CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH SERVICES, GUIDELINES REGARDING THE WITHDRAWAL

OR WITHHOLDING OF LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENTS IN LONG TERM CARE FACILITIES (Aug.
7, 1987) (Administrative regulations governing surrogate decision-making). Some of these
laws expressly require the family member to make a decision in accordance with the patient's
wishes, e.g., TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4590h.4C(b) (Vernon Supp. 1989) None, however,
require clear and convincing evidence of a patient's wishes as a predicate for ending
treatment. See generally Areen, The Legal Status of Consent Obtained From Families of Adult
Patients to Withhold or Withdraw Treatment, 258 J. A.M.A. 229 (1987).
30. ARIZONA: Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 219-21, 741 P.2d 674, 686-88 (1987);
CAUFORNIA: In re Drabick, 200 Cal. App. 3d 185, 208-12, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840, 855-59 (Ct.
App. 1988), review denied (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1988), cert denied 109 S. Ct. 399 (1988); Barber v.
Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1021, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 492-93 (Ct. App. 1983);
CONNECnctYr: Foody v. Manchester Memorial Hosp., 40 Conn. Supp. 127, 138-41, 482 A.2d
713, 720-22 (Super. Ct. 1984); DELAWARE: In re Severns, 425 A.2d 1334, 1347 (Del Ch.
1980); FLORIDA: John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Bludworth, 452 So.2d 921, 926
(Fla. 1984); GEORGIA: In re L.H.R., 253 Ga. 439, 446, 321 S.E.2d 716, 722-23 (1984).
MASSACHUSSETS: Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728,
749-55, 370 N.E.2d 417, 429-32 (1977). MICHIGAN: In re Rosebush, No. 88-349180A2, slip
op. at 11-12 (Mich. Cir. Ct. July 29, 1988); MINNESOTA: In re Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332, 337-38
(Minn. 1984); NEW JERSEY: In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 420, 529 A.2d 434, 447, stay denied
sub nom. Lincoln Park Nursing Home and Convalescent Home v. Kahn, 108 S. Ct. 6 (1987);
In re Conroy, 98 NJ. 321, 357-77, 486 A.2d 1209, 1227-37 (1985); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J 10,
355 A.2d 647, 664, cert deniedsub nom. Garger v. United States, 429 U.S. 922 (1976); NORTH
DAKOTA: In re Bayer, No. 4131, slip op. at 13-15 (N.D. Burleigh County Ct., Feb. 11, 1987)
(Riskedahl, J.); RHODE ISLAND: Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580, 587-88 (D.R.I. 1988);
WASHINGTON: In re Grant, 109 Wash. 2d 545, 566-67, 747 P.2d 445, 454 (1987), modified, 757
P.2d 534 (1988); In re Hamlin, 102 Wash. 2d 810, 816-22, 689 P.2d 1372, 1376-79 (1984); In
re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 124-28, 660 P.2d 738, 744-46 (1983). But see Cruzan v. Harmon,
760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988) (en bane) (guardian-parents lack authority to direct withdrawal
of artificial nutrition and hydration from permanently unconscious patient), reh 'g denied (Mo.
Sup. Ct. 1988); Sanchez v. Fairview Developmental Center, No. CV 88-0129, slip op. (C.D.
Cal. 1988) (conservator has no constitutional right to refuse treatment on behalf of patient).
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in at least some circumstances, to authorize the discontinuance of
life-supports. 1
The clear and convincing evidence standard has proven an
onerous and difficult standard for health care providers to apply. 2
Instances arise in which the family believes that the patient would
not want further treatment, the physician concludes that continued
The New York Court of Appeals' absolute rejection of surrogate decision-making also
runs counter to predominant ethical and medical views. E.g., PRESIDENTS COMMISSION FOR
THE STUDY OF ETHICAL ISSUES IN MEDICINE AND BIOCHEMICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH,

DECIDING To FOREGO LIFE SUSTAINING TREATMENT 121-70 (1983)[hereinafter DECIDING To
FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT]; THE HASTINGS CENTER, GUIDELINES ON THE
TERMINATION OF LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT AND THE CARE OF THE DYING 22-26 (1987);
JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, CURRENT OPINIONS OF THE
COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION § 2.18
(1986).
31. As a result of a statute enacted in 1987, decisions about entering Do Not Resuscitate
(DNR) orders are excepted from the general rule against surrogate decision-making for
life-sustaining treatment decisions. N.Y. PUBLIC HEALTH LAW 09 2960 - 78 (McKinney Supp.
1989). A DNR order is a physician's instruction to the medical staff not to attempt cardiopulmonary resuscitation in the event the patient suffers cardiac or respiratory arrest. Id. §
2961.13 (defining "order not to resuscitate"). The statute provides, with respect to patients
who lack capacity, that a DNR order is lawful if the patient is in one of four specified
medical conditions, provided an appropriate surrogate decision maker consents to the DNR
order. Id. § 2965. A statutory priority list identifies persons who may act as surrogate
decision-maker for the purpose of the DNR decision. Id. § 2965.4. Although the surrogate
must make a decision based on the patient's known wishes or best interests, a decision to
consent to a DNR order need not be supported by clear and convincing evidence. Id. §
2965.5(a). The law also empowers an adult to select a person to make a decision about
resuscitation in the event the adult loses the capacity to make that decision directly. Id. §
2965.2 - .3. The designated individual would then have the highest priority if a surrogate
decision is required. Id. § 2965.4(a)(i). Recognition of an adult's right to designate the
DNR decision-maker is novel and significant, but of limited utility: it does not enable an adult
to appoint someone to make other life-sustaining treatment decisions for the adult.
32. For criticisms by courts and commentators of New York's exclusive reliance on the
clear and convincing evidence standard, see In re O'Connor, 72 N.Y.2d 517, 535-59, 531
N.E.2d 607, 619, 534 N.Y.S.2d 886, 895-97 (1988) (Hancock, J., dissenting); Id., 72 N.Y.2d
at 539-42, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 897-900 (Simons, J., dissenting); Storar, 52 N.Y.2d at 383-91, 420
N.E.2d at 74-77, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 276-81 (Jones. J., dissenting); In re Hier, 18 Mass. App. 200,
203 n.9, 464 N.E.2d 959, 963 n.9 (Ct. App. 1984), review denied, 392 Mass. 1102, 465 N.E.2d
261 (1984); Drabick, 206 Cal. App. 3d at 211, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 856-57; WILLIAMS, Brother
Fox and John Storar:An Analysis of the New York Court of Appeals' Decisions, in LEGAL AND
ETHICAL ASPECTS OF TREATING CRITCAL AND TERMINALLY ILL PATIENTS 164 (Doudera &
Peters ed. 1982); Note, A Patient's Last Rights -- Termination of Medical Care -- an Analysis
of New York's In re Storar, 46 ALB. L. REV. 1380 (1982); Note, In re Storar, the Right to Die
and Incompetent Patients, 43 U. Prrr. L. REV. 1087 (1982)
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treatment does not serve the patient's interest, yet there is
insufficient proof to base the discontinuance of treatment on the
patient's deliberate choice."

A recent New York Court of Appeals decision, Matter of
O'Connor,warns that the clear and convincing evidence standard is
"rigorous" and "demanding," requiring proof "sufficient to persuade
the trier of fact that the patient held a firm and settled commitment
to the termination of life-supports under the circumstances like
those presented."' Moreover, to meet the standard, the patient's
statements must refer to treatments and circumstances that are not

"qualitatively different" from those actually confronted.
By insisting upon a high level of proof of the patient's wishes

before life-sustaining treatment can be discontinued, Matter of

O'Connordraws the problem identified by the Task Force into even
sharper focus: While the capable adult has a broad right to refuse
treatment, once that adult loses capacity it is less likely than ever
that his or her desire to refuse treatment will be honored., Hence
33. E.g., In re Alderson (Kimbrough), No. 90193/86, slip op. (Sup Ct., N.Y. Co. Aug.
3, 1988)(Ciparik, J.). See also Elbaum v. Grace Plaza of Great Neck, Inc., N.Y.L.J. Mar. 16,
1989 at 26, col. 6 (Sup. Ct., Nassau Co.) (McCabe, J.).
34.
O'Connor, 72 N.Y.2d 517, 531, 531 N.E.2d 607, 611-12, 534 N.Y.S.2d 886, 893
(1988), rev'g O'Connor, 139 A.D.2d 344, 532 N.Y.S.2d 133 (2d Dep't 1988) and sub nom. In
re Westchester County Medical Center (O'Connor), No. 10002/88, slip op. (Sup. Ct.,
Westchester County, July 27, 1988) (Colabella, J.).
35. O'Connor, 72 N.Y.S.2d at 533, 531 N.E.2d at 607, 618, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 893.
36. See Annas, Precatory Predictionand Mindless Mimicry: The Case of Mary O'Connor,
18 HASTINGS CENTER REPORT 31 (Dec. 1988) (contending that by requiring adults to predict
how they will die and what medical interventions they want to forego, the O'Connor ruling
"destroys personal autonomy and denies the rights of previously competent patients." Id at
32.) Two post O'Connor decisions, Hayner v. Child's Nursing Home, No. 0188-015609, slip
op. (Sup. Ct., Albany Co., Dec. 5, 1988) (McDermott, J.) and Elbaum v. Grace Plaza of
Great Neck, Inc., N.Y.LJ. Mar. 16, 1989 at 26, col. 6 (Sup. Ct., Nassau Co.) (McCabe, J.)
illustrate the increased difficulty patients may face in securing their right to decline treatment
without an advance directive. In Hayner, the court denied a petition to discontinue the
artificial provision of nutrition and hydration for a 92 year old woman in a permanent
vegetative state. Hayner, No. 0180-015609, slip. op. at 5. Two witnesses testified that the
patient, after seeing another nursing home patient have artificial nutrition supplied by a
gastronomy tube, told them that she "did not want to live on a feeding tube." Id. at 4. The
court, relying on O'Connor, held that the patient's statements were "a reaction to the
unfortunate situation of another" and did not constitute clear and convincing evidence of the
patient's wish to decline medical treatment. Id.
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9

the need for advance directives: documents created by an adult in
advance of a loss of capacity to ensure that the person's wishes
about health care are honored in the event of a subsequent loss of
capacity. Two types of devices are used as advance directives: living
wills and health care proxies.
IL LIVING WnI.S
A living will is a well-known, straightforward device for
conveying an adult's desire to refuse treatment.37 Typically, the
document states that, in the event the adult is found to be terminally ill or permanently unconscious, and incapable of deciding about
treatment directly, he or she directs that life-sustaining treatment be
withdrawn or withheld.' The document is signed, usually witnessed
Elbaum similarly involved a family's petition to have a gastrointestinal tube removed from
a permanently unconscious woman. Elbaum, N.Y.U., Mar. 16, 1989 at 26, col. 6. The court
held that, although Mrs. Elbaum had told others of her wish not to have her dying prolonged,
and to die "with dignity," her statements were not sufficiently specific to meet the O'Connor
standard. Id at 27, col. 2. Notably, the court expressed its dismay at the "unworkable" rule
imposed by O'Connor, and called for legislative change. Id at 27, col. 2.
37. See generally CONCERN FOR DYING, THE LVING WLL AND OTHER ADVANCE
DIREcnvEs (1986); BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 1434 (5th ed. 1985).
38. The two leading organizations that promote the use of living wills are Concern for
Dying, 250 W. 57th Street, NY, NY 10107 and Society for the Right to Die, 250 W. 57th
Street, NY, NY 10107. A form widely distributed by Concern for Dying states, in part: "If at
such time the situation should arise in which there is no reasonable expectation of my
recovery from extreme physical or mental disability, I direct that I be allowed to die and not
be kept alive by medications, artificial means or heroic measures."
A form widely distributed by Society for the Right to Die states, in part:
If I should be in an incurable or irreversible mental
or physical condition with no reasonable expectation
of recovery, I direct my attending physician to
withhold or withdraw treatment that merely prolongs
my dying ....
I especially do not want

[the

form offers examples of treatments the declarant
might want to specifically refuse, e.g., cardiac
resuscitation].
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and sometimes notarized, depending on the requirements of the
jurisdiction.39
Living wills may vary from the description above in numerous
respects. They may, for example, contain a broader statement of the
medical conditions in which the adult would want treatment
discontinued; they may set forth a list of specific treatments that are
to be withheld or withdrawn; they may expressly release health care
professionals from liability for honoring the document. Moreover,
there is no reason in theory why an adult might not use the
document to convey his or her wish to receive life-sustaining
treatment or specific measures, though evidently few persons create
a living will for that purpose.'
Thirty-nine states and the District of Columbia have living will
statutes, sometimes called "Natural Death Acts," that recognize the
validity of living wills and establish procedural and substantive
protections concerning their use.4" Such statutes facilitate reliance
upon living wills by declaring their legality and bestowing immunity
upon health care providers who honor them. The statutes may also
serve an important educational function.
New York is among the minority of states that has no living will
statute, 42 notwithstanding the frequent introduction of related bills
in the State Legislature. 43 The Task Force, while supportive of the
39.

In states, like New York, that do not have living will legislation, there are no specific

execution requirements. Nonetheless, the weight later given to the document by health care
providers or a court may depend, in part, on the formalities employed in creating the

document. Thus both Concern for Dying and Society for the Right to Die provide places
for two witness signatures in their nonstatutory living will forms.
40.

Indiana's living will statute is unique in prescribing a "Life Prolonging Procedures

Declaration," whereby a declarant may request the provision of treatment. IND. CODE ANN.
§§ 16-8-11-12(c) (Burns Supp. 1988).
41. SOCIETY FOR THE RIGHT To DIE, HANDBOOK OF LVING WILL LAWS (1987). See also
In re Farrell, 108 NJ. 335, 338 n.2, 529 A.2d 404, 407 n.2 (1987) (citing 39 living will
statutes). A living will statute enacted by Minnesota in 1989, Act of Mar. 3, 1989, 1989 Minn.
Laws 3, does not appear in the foregoing sources.
42. Cf. N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAw § 2964.2(b) (McKinney 1985, 1988 Supp.) (authorizing
advance directives to forgo resuscitation).
43. APPOINTING A HEALTH CARE AGENT, supra note 1, at 76. See also Note, To Die or
Not to Die: The New York Legislature Ponders a Natural Death Act, 13 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
639 (1985).
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use of advance directives, chose not to recommend enactment of
living will legislation." It explained that a living will statute, unless
part of a comprehensive scheme for decision-making for all
incapable patients, can actually impede a patient's or family's desire
for treatment to be withdrawn.' For example, by identifying
procedures that must be followed to refuse treatment in compliance
with the statute, living will laws may increase the reluctance of
health care providers to carry out wishes of patients that are
expressed in noncomplying ways, e.g., orally, or in a procedurally
defective writing.' Moreover, living will statutes tend to narrowly
define the categories of treatments that may be withdrawn, and the
medical conditions under which they may be withdrawn."
The Task Force also emphasized that New York law already
"provides strong support for reliance on living wills" because the
document can provide clear and convincing evidence of the patient's
44. APPOINTING A HEALTH CARE AGENT, supra note 1, at 80-83.
45. Id. at 82.
46. Id. See also DECIDING To FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT, supra note 22, at
144-45. This attitude, though real, ordinarily is not justifiable since living laws expressly or
implicitly provide a non-exclusive means for a an individual to assert his or her right to refuse
treatment. E.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 16-8-11-18(e), 19 (Burns Supp. 1988); TEx. REV. CIV.
STAT. ANN. ART. 4590h(11) (Vernon Supp. 1989).
47. APPOINTING A HEALTH CARE AGENT, supra note 1, at 82; Heintz, Legislative Hazard:
Keeping Patients Living Against Their Will, 14 J.MED. ETHIcs 82 (1988). For example, the
Missouri statute authorizes the withdrawal of a "death-prolonging procedure" when a patient
is in a "terminal condition." Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 459.010 - .055 (Vernon Supp. 1987).
"Death-prolonging procedure" is defined to exclude the provision nutrition and hydration. Id.
§ 459.010(3). 'Terminal condition" is defined as "an incurable or irreversible condition which,
in the opinion of the attending physician, is such that death will occur within a short time
regardless of the application of medical procedures." Id. § 459.010(6). Under those strictures,
an adult could not direct the withdrawal of nutrition and hydration in the event of permanent
unconsciousness -- at least pursuant to the statute. The Missouri statute, like many others,
states that it is not to be interpreted to impair other rights the person has to direct the
withdrawal of treatment. Id. § 459.055(2).
Indeed, to the extent those rights are
constitutionally protected, a living will statute could not impair them, even if it purported
to do so. See, e.g., Corbett v. D'Alessandro, 487 So. 2d 368 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986), review
denied, 492 So.2d 1331 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1986) (Florida living will law cannot constitutionally
impair patient's right to refuse artificial nutrition and hydration). Nonetheless, health care
providers may perceive such laws as establishing the outer limits of the patient's right to
refuse treatment, or at least the safe harbor in which they are willing to honor those rights
without a court order.
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wishes.' It urged professional and public education to counter
reluctance to honor living wills, and called upon health care facilities
to develop procedures to promote creation and reliance on the
documents.49
The 1988 O'Connor decision confirmed the Task Force's view
of the legal support for living wills.5" In discussing the type of proof
that would meet the clear and convincing evidence standard, the
court of appeals stated that "[t]he ideal situation is one in which the
patient's wishes were expressed in some form of a writing, perhaps
a 'living will,' while he or she was still competent."51 It explained that
the existence of a writing indicates that the person is both likely to
be serious about those wishes, and likely to make sure to express
any "subsequent changes of heart."5"
Thus, while there is no statute in New York that establishes the
validity of living wills, health care providers may with confidence
withdraw or withhold treatment based on a patient's wishes
expressed in a living will,53 provided there is no reason to doubt the
document's authenticity or believe it to have been repudiated, and
48. APPOINTING A H tALTH
CARE AGENT, supra note 1, at 82.
49. Id. at 83.
50. In re O'Connor, 72 N.Y.2d 517, 531 N.E.2d 607, 534 N.Y.S.2d 886 (1988).
51. Id. at 531, 531 N.E.2d 618, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 892.
52. Id. at 531, 531 N.E.2d 618, 534 N.Y.S. at 892-93.
53. See Miller & Swidler, Legislative Initiatives on Life-Sustaining Treatment: The Do-NotResuscitate Law and Health Care Proxy Proposal, 61 N.Y.S. BAR J. 40, 46 (Feb. 1989). Nor
are health care providers required to seek a judicial assessment of the sufficiency of a living
will before honoring it. Cf. In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 382-83, 420 N.E.2d 64, 69, 438
N.Y.S.2d 266, 276 (1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981).
In fact, when adult's objection to treatment is clear, as may be the case if there is a living
will, health care professionals risk liability for imposing that procedure on the patient. See,
e.g, Estate of Leach v. Shapiro, 13 Ohio App. 3d 393, 469 N.E.2d 1047 (1984) (upholding
cause of action for wrongfully placing patient on life-support system); McVey v. Englewood
Hosp. Ass'n, 216 NJ. Super. 502, 524 A.2d 450 (1987) (affirming dismissal of claim that
hospital failed to honor patient's undocumented request to forgo treatment.) See generally,
Comment, Damage Actions for Nonconsensual Life-Sustaining Treatment, 30 ST. Louis U.L.J.
895 (1986); Oddi, The Tort of Interference With the Right to Die: The Wrongful Living Cause
of Action, 75 GEo. Li. 625 (1986); Myers, Health Care Provider Civil Liabilityfor Denying the
Patient'sRight to Refuse Life-Sustaining (Death Defering)Medical Treatment, 38 FED'N INS. &
CORP. COUNS. Q. 263 (1988).
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provided the document adequately speaks to the treatment decisions
that are actually confronted.
That final proviso touches upon the most significant problem
inherent in the use of living wills: the difficulty of anticipating and
providing for the treatment decisions that will be confronted. Some
adults may already suffer from a known deteriorating condition, and
are thus able to predict with great confidence the treatment choice
that will arise after they lose capacity. Most adults, however, have
little or no idea what illness or injury may befall them, and what
medical treatment decision may later arise. For the latter, a living
will provide a way to avoid a specific prospect they find abhorrent,
e.g., being permanently unconscious and attached indefinitely to a
respirator. Or it may provide a means to convey a more general
sense of their wish to limit treatment toward the end of their life,
to die peacefully and with dignity. In either case, because an
individual can rarely foresee and provide specifically for future
treatment decisions, his or her living will may fail to squarely address
the treatment issue that actually arises. It may leave others asking,
"when she wrote that, did she mean this?"54
IM APPOINTING A HEALTH CARE AGENT

The Task Force concluded that the appointment of a health
care agent "is the best vehicle to protect a person's rights and
interests following the loss of decision-making capacity."" Appoint54. See, e.g., Evans v. Bellevue Hosp., N.Y.L.J., July 28, 1987, at 11, col. 1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.)
(Sandifer, J.); In re Kerr (Essner), No. 21748-86, slip op. (Sup. Ct. Bronx Co. Dec. 17, 1986)
(Turret, J.). Among the many commentators who have noted the interpretive problem are:
APPOINTING A HEALTH CARE AGENT, supra note 1, at 75-76; Cantor, Conroy, Best Interests and
the Handling of Dying Patients, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 543, 559-60 (1985); Relman, Michigan's
Sensible "Living Will" 300 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1270 (1979); Bok, Personal Directions for Care
at the End of Life, 295 NEw ENG. J. MED. 367, 368-69 (1976); Eisendrath & Jonsen, The
Living Will: Help or Hindrance?, 249 J. A.M.A. 2054 (1983); Peters, Advance Directives: The
Case for the Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care, 8 J. LEGAL MED. 437, 444-448 (1987).
The President's Commission comments that a living will may be "more useful in excluding

certain procedures that are totally unacceptable to the patient than in fine-tuning
decisionmaking about a full range of possible health care choices." DECIDING To FOREGO
LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT, supra note 30, at 158.
55. APPOINTING A HEALTH CARE AGENT, supra note 1, at 81.
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ment of an agent can accomplish the same objective as a living will,
that is, securing an adult's wish to die "with dignity" by forgoing
procedures that prolong the dying process. Moreover, the agency
approach offers several advantages in achieving that objective, and
is valuable for other objectives as well.
First and foremost, use of a health care agent facilitates
resolution of interpretation problems that afflict the use of living
wills. 6 Drawing on his or her instructions and knowledge of the
principal, the agent can ascertain the principal's wishes and apply
them to the life-sustaining treatment decision. Health care professionals can rely on the agent's reasonable interpretation with greater
confidence, both that they are honoring the patient's wishes, and
that they are acting lawfully."
Indeed, the agent's interpretive role can prove valuable even
when the patient's wishes on the central life-sustaining treatment
decision are clear. The agent can answer numerous collateral
decisions that may arise, such as whether an invasive diagnostic
procedure should be undertaken, or whether pain medication or
other comfort measure should be provided even though it may
shorten the patient's life.
The Task Force also recognized the value of a health care
agent beyond the life-sustaining treatment context as a means to
provide consent to treatment the patient would want and expect."
While health care providers customarily seek and accept substitute
consent from the patient's spouse or next-of-kin 9 there are several
circumstances in which that practice is inadequate or problematic.
56. Id. at 78. See also Note, Appointing an Agent to Make Medical Treatment Choices, 84
COLUM. L. REv. 985, 1005 (1984); Peters, Advance Medical Directives: The Case for the
Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care, 8 J. LEGAL MED. 437 (1987).
57. This assumes that the jurisdiction is one that permits the delegation of life-sustaining
treatment decisions to an agent.
58. APPOINTING A HEALTH CARE AGENT, supra note 1, at 78.
59. See HOsPrrAL LAW MANUAL 115, 125 (1986); MACDONALD, MEYER & ESSIG, HEALTH
CARE LAW: A PRACnCAL GUIDE 18-53 (1988) [hereinafter HEALTH CARE LAW]; Meisel, The

Exceptions to the Informed Consent Doctrine: Striking a Balance Between Competing Valtes in
Medical Decisionmaking,1979 Wis. L. REv. 413, 478-81 (1979); Areen, supra note 21, at 229.
See also Annotation, Mental Competency of Patient to Consent to SurgicalOperation or Medical
Treatment, 25 A.L.R.3d 1441 (1969).
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The patient may have no family, or no relative available, willing, and
capable of deciding.' Family members may disagree about the course
of treatment, raising the question of who has the authority to
decide.61 Or the patient may have a closer relationship with a
non-related person than with his or her family. 2
While some states have general substitute consent statutes that
list the persons who can provide consent for an incapable adult,'
New York does not.' There are some statutory procedures in New
York for empowering a health care decision-maker or obtaining a
health care decision on behalf of an incapable adult. 5 However,
these generally require judicial involvement, either to appoint the
decision-maker or to rule on the treatment question directly.
Extra-judicial surrogate decision-making is expressly authorized only
in limited circumstances, primarily relating to patients in mental
60. See, e.g., In re Harvey U, 116 A.D.2d 351, 355, 501 N.Y.S.2d 920, 923 (3d Dep't
1986) (relative declined to become involved); In re Long Island Jewish-Hillside Medical
Center, 73 Misc. 2d 395, 342 N.Y.S.2d 356 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
61. See, e.g., In re Nemser, 51 Misc. 2d 616, 273 N.Y.S.2d 624 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
62. See infra note 69.
63. AR. STAT. ANN. § 20-9-602 (1987); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-9-2 (1985); IDAHO CODE
§ 39-4303 (1985); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-8-12-4 (Burns Supp. 1988); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
40:1299.53 (West 1977); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 20-107 (1987); Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 41-41-3 (Supp. 1988); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 431.061 (Vernon Supp. 1989); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 90-21.13(a) (1985); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-5 (1987); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.70.065
(Supp. 1989).
64. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2504.2 (McKinney 1985) prescribes who may consent to
treatment on behalf of a minor, but not for an incapacitated adult.
65. E.g., N.Y. MENTAL HYO. LAW, §§ 77.01-.41 (McKinney 1988) (conservator); N.Y.
MENTAL HYG. LAw, §9 78.01-.31 (committee); N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. Acr §§ 1750-55
(McKinney Supp. 1989) (guardians of mentally retarded persons). While the New York
Mental Hygiene Law enables an adult to select someone as his or her Article 78 committee,
a court must still approve the appointment. N.Y. MENTAL HYo. LAw § 78.05 (McKinney
1988). There is a current debate about whether an Article 77 conservator can make health
care decisions. See Elbaum v. Grace Plaza of Great Neck, Inc., No. 8892-88, slip op. (Sup Ct.,
Nassau Co., Sept. 9, 1988) (McCabe, J.) (conservator can represent patient in health care
decisions); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH § 2803-c(j) (McKinney 1985) (patient's rights may be exercised
by "appointed committee or conservator in representative capacity"); Moore, The Durable
Power of Attorney as an Alternative to the Improper Use of Conservatorshipfor Health Care
Decision-Making, 60 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 631, 634 (1986)(contending that conservators lack
statutory authority to make health care decisions).
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health facilities." As the Task Force observed, commencing a judicial
proceeding to obtain consent is a "costly, cumbersome process" that
can delay the provision of even "routine surgical procedures that are
clearly beneficial for the patient."' 7
Appointment of an agent thus affords obvious advantages for
both patient and provider. For instance, an adult who has no close
relatives can appoint a more distant relative, a friend, or other
trusted person to consent for him or her in the event of a loss of
capacity. The availability of an agent enables providers to avoid
either the undue burden of obtaining a court order or the legal
uncertainty of treating without consent.
Moreover, some adults who have relatives might want someone
else to make health care decisions for them. Indeed, a Harris poll
demonstrated that a significant minority of adults would prefer a
friend, doctor, or lawyer to speak for them.' While the designation
of a non-relative might reflect distrust or estrangement, it could also
stem from noble, or at least benign, concerns. For instance, a man
may wish to spare his wife the grief and emotional distress of
making the decision he would want made. He could use a health
care proxy to document that preference, and that would enable
health care providers to honor his decision."
66.

For example, Office of Mental Health regulations recognize consent by "a spouse,

a parent, an adult child or a court of competent jurisdiction" on behalf of an institutionalized
adult who lacks capacity. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 14, § 27.9 (1986). Moreover, in
1985 the New York State Legislature empowered surrogate decision-making committees to

make health care decisions for incapable residents at certain mental hygiene facilities. N.Y.
MENTAL HYG. LAw §§ 80.01-.13 (McKinney 1988). See Sundram, Informed Consentfor Major
Medical Treatment of Mentally Disabled People, 318 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1368 (1988).
67. APPOINTING A HEALTH CARE AGENT, supra note 1, at 16.
68. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL ISSUES IN MEDICINE AND
BIOCHEMICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, 2 MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS 240 (1982)
[hereinafter MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS]. The poll asked 1251 adults who they want
to make an important medical decision if they were too sick to make the decision. Fifty-seven
percent chose "a family member," 31% chose their doctor, 6% chose their doctor together
with a family member or friend, and 2% chose their lawyer. Id See also THE CITIZENS
COMMITTEE ON BIOMEDICAL ETHICS, INC., YOUR HEALTH, YOUR CHOICES, WHOSE DECISION,
FINAL REPORT 20-21 (1988) (Survey of New Jersey citizens containing similar inquiry).
69. Homosexual patients, particularly those with Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
(AIDS), are another category of persons who are apt to prefer a nonrelated decisionmaker.

Steinbrook, Lo, Moulton, Saika, Hollander, Volberding, Preferences of Homosexual Men with
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The Task Force also considered it important that the agent's
consent to treatment, or to the withdrawal of treatment, should be
informed.' That is, it should be based on current information about
the risks and benefits of, and alternatives to, the proposed treatment
or nontreatment. In this sense, a health care agent's decision more
nearly approximates the patient's informed consent than an
instruction in a living will.
Similarly, an agent--unlike a document--can discuss matters with
the physician and family members, and can engage in a collaborative
approach to ascertain the patient's wishes and interests under the
circumstances. Indeed, the Task Force's report acknowledges the
continuing role that non-appointed family members and the
physician have in providing information and advice, and in scrutinizing the agent's decision." However, the appointment establishes
that the agent--not a non-appointed family member, not the
physician, not the hospital, not a court--has the initial and primary
responsibility for applying the patient's wishes to the specific
circumstances.'
The agency approach may also be more effective in that it
encourages a specific person, the health care agent, to strive to
implement the patient's wishes and interests. This in turn induces
the health care professionals to honor those wishes: a person
holding a document and speaking for the patient is apt to be more
effective in securing the patient's wishes than a document speaking
alone.
Finally, it warrants emphasis that the appointment of an agent
is purely a procedural approach. It merely identifies the surrogate
decision-maker and is not inherently weighted in favor of any
AIDS for Life-Sustaining Treatment, 314 N. ENG. J. MED. 457 (1986). See, e.g., Evans v.
Bellevue Hosp., N.Y.J., July 28, 1987, at 11, col. 1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.). A recent, widely
publicized dispute in Minnesota between a patient's parents and homosexual lover over health
care decisions and visitation illustrates the problems that may arise when the patient's wishes

are unclear. See Brozan, Gay Groups Are Rallied to Aid Two Womens' Fight, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 7, 1988, at A26, col. 1.
70. APPOINTING A HEALTH CARE AGENT, supra note 1, at 78.

71.

Id. at 92-93, 119-20.

72.
However, the principal could require the concurrence of a physician or another
person as a limitation on the agent's authority.
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outcome in treatment decisions. Persons who fear that their dying
will be prolonged by extraordinary measures can direct their agent
to protect them from that event. Those who are concerned about
treatment being discontinued prematurely, or who oppose the
withdrawal of certain measures such as artificial nutrition and
hydration, can instruct their agent to insist upon the provision of
such measures. Even those who have no specific concern in mind
might wish to appoint an agent to ensure that someone whose
judgment they trust will have the authority to protect their interests
when health care decisions must be made.
There are, of course, risks associated with the appointment of
an agent. 73 An agent may act negligently, irrationally, or in bad faith.
But this danger, which is inherent in any surrogate decision, is less
likely to occur when one personally selects his or her representative
than when one does not. Moreover, important substantive and
procedural protections can be attached to decisions
by agents, as
74
illustrated by the Health Care Proxy proposal.
There are other inherent limitations of the health care proxy
approach. For instance, not every individual knows someone whom
they trust enough to make health care decisions for him or her, or
who is willing and capable to do so. Many persons, for example,
have no close relatives, or place no special trust in their family
members. Of course, the health care proxy enables an individual to
expand the universe of persons who may act on the person's behalf.
Thus, a person who does not have a family could, with a proxy,
appoint a friend, neighbor, or colleague to make decisions for him
or her. But there will be persons who cannot identify, or choose not
to designate, someone to exercise such authority. The Task Force
suggested that, for such persons, a living will remains the best means
7
to protect their wishes with respect to life-sustaining treatment.
73. See Buchanen, PrincipallAgentTheory and Decisionmaking in Health Care, 2 BIOETHIcS

317, 324 (1988) (discussing "agency risk" due to divergence of interest and asymmetry of
information between principal and agent).
74.
75.

See infra 38-47.
APPOINTING A HEALTH CARE AGENT, supra note 1, at 83.
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More important, even for adults who have someone to appoint,
the proxy approach offers no advantage unless they actually appoint
that person. Without significant educational efforts and, indeed,
cultural change, it is unlikely that great numbers of adults will have
the foresight to create health care proxies. Thus, the recognition of
health care proxies by no means obviates the need to address the
broader issue: surrogate decision-making for patients who lack
capacity and who did not appoint an agent.7'
The concept of health care proxies has attracted strong national
support from interested commissions and organizations in addition
to the New York State Task Force on Life and the Law. The
President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in
Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research, in its widely
regarded 1981 report, Deciding to Forego Life-Sustaining Treatment,
provided the first major endorsement of the use of health care
proxies for life-sustaining treatment decisions." The U.S. Office of
Technology Assessment, which advises Congress on scientific affairs,
emphasized the usefulness of proxy appointments in its 1988 report
on life-sustaining treatment protocols." The Hastings Center, a
leading center for the study of bioethics, encouraged the use of
health care proxies in its 1987 Guidelines. 9
The American Medical Association, in 1986, endorsed and
began to distribute a Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care
Act.' The American Hospital Association also encouraged the use
of durable powers to designate surrogate decision-makers." Com76.
The Task Force is currently devising policy recommendations on surrogate
decision-making for persons who do not appoint a health care agent.
77. DECIDING To FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT, supra note 30, at 146-47.
78. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, INSTITUTIONAL PROTOCOLS FOR DECISIONS
ABOUT LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT 40 (1988).
79. THE HASTINGS CENTER, supra note 30, at 78.
80. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASS'N, DURABLE POWER OF ATrORNEY FOR HEALTH CARE ACT
(Proposed) (Oct. 1986), available from the American Medical Association, Department of
State Legislation, Chicago, Il1.
81. SPECIAL COMMITEE ON BIOMEDICAL ETHICS OF THE AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASS'N,
VALUES IN CONFLICT, RESOLVING ETHICAL ISSUES IN HOSPITAL CARE 22 (1987).
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mentators in numerous medical and bioethical journals express
support for the proxy approach to surrogate decision-making."
The legal community has also promoted the concept.' In 1982,
the National Commissioners for Uniform Laws adopted a Model
Health Care Consent Act, which would expressly authorize the
appointment of a "health care representative."' In 1988 they held

proceedings to add a proxy provision to the Uniform Rights of the
Terminally Ill Act.' The American Bar Association Commission on

Legal Problems of the Elderly recently issued a paper explaining the
status and advantages of using durable powers.'
National patient advocacy organizations, such as Concern for
Dying87 and Society for the Right to Die' support the use of health
care proxies, as an alternative or a supplement to a living will.
82. E.g., Bok, supra note 54; Relman, supra note 54; Lanzer, Adelstein, Cranford,
Federman, Hook, Moertel, Safar, Stone, Taussig, van Eys, The Physician's Responsibili,
Toward Hopelessly Ill Patients, 310 N. ENG. J. MED. 955, 956 (1986); Buchanen, supra note
73; Letter to the editor by JoAnne Lynn, MD, Availability of Durable Power of Attorney for
Health Care, 312 NEW ENG. J. MED. 248 (1985).
83. For legal commentary supporting the appointment of a health care agent, see Collin,
Planning and Drafting Durable Powers of Attorney for Health Care, in INsTrrrUTE OF ESTATE
PLANNING, 5-1 - 5-145 (1988); F. COLLIN, JR., J. LOMBARD, A. MOSES & H. SPITLER,
DRAFTING THE DURABLE POWER OF ATrORNEY, A SYSTEMS APPROACH (2d ed. 1987)
[hereinafter DRAFTING THE DURABLE POWER]; Note, supra note 56; Areen, supra note 29, at
230; S.Martyn & L. Jacobs, Legislating Advance Directives for the Tenninally 11.The Living
Will and Durable Power of Attorney, 63 NEB. L. REV. 779 (1984).
84. MODEL HEALTH-CARE CONSENT ACT § 6, 9 U.L.A. Part I, 453 (1988). See also
MYERS, MEDICO-LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF DEATH & DYING § 16:10 (Supp. 1988).
85. Telephone conversation with John McCabe, Legislative Director/Legal Counsel of the
Uniform Law Commissioners (Jan. 12, 1989).
86. Am.BAR ASS'N COMM'N ON LEGAL PROBLEMS OF THE ELDERLY, HEALTH CARE
DURABLE POWER OF ATTORNEY LEGISLATION: STATUS REPORT (Informational Mailing 89-1).
The Commission is currently preparing materials to encourage the bar and public to execute
such documents. Telephone conversation with Charles P. Sabbatino, Assistant Staff Director,
Am. Bar Ass'n Comm'n on Legal Problems of the Elderly (Jan. 24, 1989). See also Am.BAR
ASS'N COMM'N ON LEGAL PROBLEMS OF THE ELDERLY, PRESIDENTIAL SHOWCASE PROGRAM:

PLANNING AHEAD FOR SURROGATE DECISION-MAKING (1986).
87. CONCERN FOR DYING, supra note 37, at 32-33; The Latest Advice for Living Will
Protection: Concern's Three Prong Strategy to Make Sure All of Your Treatment Decisions Are
Honored, 12 Concern for Dying Newsletter 2 (Winter 1986). Concern for Dying's model living
will form contains a proxy provision.
88. SOCIETY FOR THE RIGHT To DIE, supra note 41, 9-10 (1987). Society for the Right
to Die's model living will form contains a proxy designation clause. The Society also
distributes forms for creating a durable power of attorney for health care.
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Modern Maturity, the magazine of the American Association of
Retired Persons (AARP), recently carried an article urging AARP

members to create durable powers for health care as well as living
wills.89
IV. LEGAL STATUS OF APPOINTING

A HEALTH

CARE AGENT

Currently, twenty-six states have statutes that expressly support
an adult's right to appoint an agent to make some or all health care
decisions.9 Those statutes fall primarily into three categories:
(1) durable power of attorney statutes;91
89. E.g., We Rage Against 1t but Being Prepared Helps Relieve the Darkless Wicn Saying
Final Goodbyes, MODERN MATuRrrY, 29, 30 (June-July 1988).
90. ALASKA STAT. § 13.26.332 (Supp. 1988); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 20-17-202(e) (Supp.
1987); CAL CIV. CODE §§ 2430-2444 (West Supp. 1989); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-14-501
(1987);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16 § 2502(b) (1983); D.C. CODE ANN. §8 21-2201 - 2209 (Supp. 1989);
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 765.05(2), 765.07 (West 1986); HAw. REV. STAT. §§ 560:5-501, 5-502
(1985); IDAHO CODE § 39-4505 (Supp. 1988); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2 para. 804 (SmithHurd Supp. 1988); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-8-12.1-.12 (Burns Supp. 1988); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 144A.7 (West Supp. 1988); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.58.3(C)(1) (West Supp. 1988);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 , § 5-501 (Supp. 1988); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. §
20-107(d) (1987); Act of Mar. 3, 1989, 1989 Minn. Laws 3; NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 449.800 - 860
(1987); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 32A-2(9) (1987); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 5602(a)(9),
5603(h) (Purdon Supp. 1986); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4.10 (Supp. 1988); TEx. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE ANN. § 4590h(3)(e) (Vernon 1989); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-1106 (Supp.
1988); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §§ 3451-3467 (Supp. 1988); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54.1-2984
(1988); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.70.065(1)(b) (Supp. 1989); WYo. STAT. § 35-22-102
(1988).
This list does not include statutes that enable a person to nominate a guardian in the
event of future incompetence. E.g., N.Y. MFrrAL HYo. LAw § 78.05 (McKinney 1988). Such
statutes are included in the chart of proxy statutes set forth in SOCIETY FOR THE RIGHT To
DIE, APPOINTING A PROXY FOR HEALTH CARE DECISIONS: ANALYSIS AND CHART OF STATE
LAWS, at 12-16 (Jan. 1988) [hereinafter SoCIETY FOR THE RIGHT To DIE, ANALYSIS AND
CHART].
91. ALASKA STAT. §§ 13.26.332 - 13.26.353 (Supp. 1988); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-14-501
(1987); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 5-501 (Supp. 1988); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 32A-9
(1987); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 5602(a)(9), 5603(h) (Purdon 1975 & Supp. 1988).
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(2) living will statutes with proxy provisions;' and
(3) health care proxy statutes.Y
Even in the remaining states, where there is no explicit authority for
delegating health care decisions, there is strong support for doing so
94
pursuant to durable power of attorney statutes.
A. Power of Attorney Statutes
1. Durable and springing powers -- generally

A power of attorney is an instrument authorizing another to act
as one's agent, or "attorney-in-fact," for some specified purpose or
range of purposes.95 The device is best known as a way to convey
authority for the transaction of business or property matters. Thus,
a "principal" will give an attorney-in-fact a power of attorney to
enable the latter to purchase property for the principal or to write
checks against the principal's bank account. Several states, including
92. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 20-17-202(e) (Supp. 1987); DEL. CODE ANN. lit. 16, § 2502(b)
(1983); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 765.05(2), 765.07 (1986); IOWA CODE ANN. § 144A.7 (West Supp.
1988); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.58.3(c)(1) (West Supp. 1988); TEx. REV. CIV. STAT.
ANN. § 4590h(3)(e) (Vernon 1989); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-1106 (Supp. 1988); VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 54.1-2984 (1988); Wyo. STAT. § 35-22-103 (1988).
93. CAL. CIV. CODE 99 2430-2444 (West 1974 & Supp. 1988); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 212205 - 2209 (Supp. 1989); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, paras. 804-1 - 804-12 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1988); IDAHO CODE § 39-4505 (Supp. 1988); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-8-12-6 (Burns Supp.
1988); Act of Mar. 3, 1989, 1989 Minn. Laws 3; NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 449.800 - 860 (1987);
R.I. GEN LAws § 23-4.10 (Supp. 1988); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 3451 - 3467 (Supp. 1988);
In this chapter, "health care proxy statute" means a statute, or a subdivision of a statute,
enacted to authorize and comprehensively govern the delegation of health care decisions.
94. See infra notes 127-35 and accompanying text.
95. See BLAcKs LAW DICTIONARY 1055 (5th ed. 1985); 2 N.Y. JUR. 2D Agency § 62
(1979). It is not necessary to execute a power of attorney to create an agency relationship.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 1, 15 (1957)(nature and creation of agency). The
agency relationship may be created by conduct, oral agreement, or written instrument. Heine
v. Papp, 97 A.D.2d 929, 471 N.Y.S.2d 18 (3d Dep't 1983). Indeed, strictly understood, the
purpose of the power of attorney is not to define the agent's authority, but "to evidence the
authority of the agent to third parties with whom the agent deals." In re Anyon's Estate, 137
Misc. 582, 585, 244 N.Y.S. 244, 248 (Sur. Ct. 1930) (quoting Keyes v. Metropolitan Trust Co.,
220 N.Y. 237, 242, 115 N.E. 455, 456 (1917)).
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New York, offer specific statutory language and procedures that may
be used to create a power of attorney." When such language is used
and procedures followed, the document conveys powers that are
defined in the statute.97
Under common law principles, the authority created by a power
of attorney expires if the principal becomes disabled or incompetent. 98 In response to this inadequacy of the device, all fifty states
have enacted legislation authorizing the creation of "durable powers
of attorney," which remain effective even after the principal becomes
incompetent. 99 Under such statutes, a power of attorney will be
considered "durable" if it contains language, often specified in the
statute, that establishes the principal's intent for the power to
remain effective despite his or her disability or incapacity."°
For certain purposes, a principal may not wish the attorney-in-fact to have authority unless and until a particular event
occurs, most commonly the principal's loss of the ability to exercise
the authority personally. For example, an elderly woman may want
to empower her son to make withdrawals from her bank account,
but only if and when she becomes unable to do so herself. To
permit this, some state statutes expressly authorize a "springing"
power of attorney, so-called because the power springs into existence
upon principal's incapacitation or other contingency.''
96. E.g., N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW §§ 5-1501 - 1602 (McKinney 1978 & Supp. 1989); CAL.
CIV. CODE § 2450 (Supp. 1989).
97. The New York statutory short form is permissive not mandatory. New York General
Obligations Law § 5-1501 states "No provision of this article shall be construed to bar the
use of any other or different form of power of attorney desired by the parties concerned."
N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1501.1 (McKinney 1978).
98. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 122, 133 (1957).
99. DRAFTING THE DURABLE POWER, supra note 83, at 6.
100. See N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1601 (McKinney 1978).
101. DRAFTING THE DURABLE POWER, supra note 83, at 9-10. In 1988, New York's powcr
of attorney statute was amended to permit the creation of springing powers. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG.
LAW § 5-1602 (McKinney Supp. 1989).
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2. Availability of durable or springing power to delegate health care
decisions
While powers of attorney have traditionally been used to
delegate authority over property matters, the usefulness of durable
and springing powers for delegating decisions more personal in
nature is also well-recognized. Indeed, durable power statutes were
promoted as a means to appoint an agent to fulfill many of the

personal functions handled by a court-appointed committee of the
person, such as managing the principal's personal finances, and
performing acts necessary to maintain the life style of the principal

and his or her family."°
Nonetheless, statutes and caselaw in New York and elsewhere

establish that certain acts are too personal to be performed by an
attorney-in-fact, even when there is an attempted delegation of such
authority. Examples of personal activities often considered
nondelegable
5

are marrying, 3 divorcing," 4 voting in a

public

election, changing an insurance beneficiary,"° exercising a right of
election against a decedent's estate," and swearing an oath.'"
It has been suggested that health care decisions are among
those matters that are too personal to be delegated to an agent."°
102. See DRAFTING THE DURABLE POWER, supra note 83, at 6-7 ('The original drafters
of the Durable Power of Attorney, in its proposed statutory form, intended it to apply to
matters relating to the care and custody of persons as well as the management of property."
Id
103. N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 12; Op. N.Y. Atty. Gen. 137 (1940). While New York does
not permit proxy marriages, it will accord full faith and credit to a proxy marriage performed
in a jurisdiction that allows such marriages. Ferraro v. Ferraro, 192 Misc. 484, 77 N.Y.S.2d
246 (N.Y. City Dora. Re. Ct. 1948), affd sub nom Fernandes v. Fernandes, 275 App. Div.
777, 87 N.Y.S.2d 7070 (2d Dep't. 1949); In re Valentine's Will, 18 Misc. 2d 701, 188 N.Y.S.2d
732 (Surr. Ct. 1959). See generally Annotation, Proxy Marriages, 170 A.L.R. 947 (1947).
104. E.g.,Mallory v. Mallory, 113 Misc. 2d 912, 450 N.Y.S.2d 272 (Sup. Ct. 1982);
Mainzer v. Avril, 108 Misc. 230, 177 N.Y.S. 596 (Sup. Ct. 1919).
105. Mansfield v. Scully, 129 Conn. 494, 502-03, 29 A.2d 444, 448-49 (1942).
106. E.g., I re Wainman, 121 Misc. 318, 320, 200 N.Y.S. 893 (Sup. Ct. 1923).
107.
Camardella v. Schwartz, 126 App. Div. 334, 337, 110 N.Y.S. 611, 613 (2d Dep't
1908).
108. E.g., Cymbol v. Cymbol, 122 A.D.2d 771-72, 505 N.Y.S.2d 657, 659 (2d Dep't 1986).
109. E.g., Op. N.Y. Att'y Gen. F 84-16 at 62, 64 (1984); Moses & Pope, Estate Planning,
Disability and the DurablePower of Attorney, 30 S.C.L. REV. 511, 530 (1979).
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That view, however, is increasingly recognized as unpersuasive." °
Every day, health care decisions are made by third persons for
incapacitated patients. Indeed, such decisions must be made, one
way or another, for the incapable patient. Surgery must be performed or withheld; antibiotics must be administered or not. Unlike
marriage, divorce, or oath-taking, there is no evading the decision.
The presence of substitute consent statutes and guardianship statutes
attest to the general recognition that, when patients lack capacity,
others must decide on their behalf... Thus, the critical question is
not whether someone else will make a decision, but who should do
so and on what basis.
Indeed, there is significant and growing authority for the
proposition .that adults may delegate medical decisions, including
decisions about life-sustaining treatment, pursuant to existing durable
power of attorney statutes. To begin with, the power of attorney
statutes of five states, Alaska, Colorado, Maine, North Carolina, and
Pennsylvania, explicitly permit or contemplate the delegation of
medical decisions.1 For example, Alaska's power of attorney statute
was amended in 1988 to expressly enable a principal to confer upon
an attorney-in-fact the authority to make health care decisions.1
The statute sets forth a checklist of various matters, including
"health care services," and states that the attorney-in-fact will have
all the powers listed except for categories the principal crosses out
and initials. 4 By statute, "health care services" includes the power
to "consent or refuse to consent to medical care or relief for the
110. E.g., Note, supra note 56, at 1009-12; DRAFTING TiE DURABLE POWER, supra note
83, at 31-34; Moore, supra note 65, at 654-55. See also, In re O'Connor, 72 N.Y.2d 517, 528,
n.2., 531 N.E.2d at 612, n.2., 534 N.Y.S.2d at 891, n.2 (1988) (view that powers of attorney
are limited to financial powers as opposed to personal decisions "has been eroded.").
111. See e.g.,
N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW, § 77.01-.41 (McKinney 1988) (conservatorship);
N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW, § 78.01-.31 (McKinney 1988) (appointment of committee); and N.Y.
MENTAL HYO. LAW, § 80.01-.13 (McKinney 1988) (Surrogate Health Care Decisionmaking).
See also stq)ra notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
112. ALASKA STAT. § 13.26.332 (Supp. 1988); CoL. REV. STAT. § 15-14-501 (1987); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18,18-A, § 5-501 (Supp. 1988); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 32A-2(9) (1987); PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. tit.
20, §§ 5602(a)(9), 5603(h) (Purdon 1975 & Supp. 1988).
113. ALASKA STAT. § 13.26.332 (Supp. 1988).
114. Id. § 13.26.332 (Supp. 1988).
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principal from pain, but the agent may not authorize the termination
of life-sustaining procedures."'15 However, the attorney-in-fact does
have the authority to "take all steps necessary to enforce
a properly
116
executed declaration" under Alaska's living will law.
The Maine durable power statute is similarly explicit, and
broader than Alaska's law." 7 It permits the principal to confer on
the attorney-in-fact any power which the principal has, "including.
. . the power to consent to, withhold consent to or approve on

behalf of the principal any medical or other professional care,
counsel, treatment or service ......"I The legislature also provided

Maine residents with a suggested form that an adult could use to
appoint an attorney-in-fact with instructions to refuse life-sustaining
treatment on behalf of the principal.
The right to delegate health care decisions pursuant to durable
power laws also has support in Hawaii, Iowa, Maryland, and
Washington by virtue of reference in other statutes." 9 For example,
Maryland and Washington have general substitute consent statutes
that accord a role to the patient's attorney-in-fact when the patient
is unable to make decisions.
To date, only two court decisions, Evans v. Bellevue"' in New
York and Matter of Peter' in New Jersey, actually consider
attempted uses of a power of attorney for health care decisions. In
Matter of Peter, the New Jersey Supreme Court granted the
application of the attorney-in-fact and close friend of an elderly
nursing home patient, to withdraw a feeding tube that was keeping
her alive in a permanent vegetative state." The court held that
115. Id. § 13.26.344(I)(2) (Supp. 1988).
116. Id. § 13.26.344(l)(3) (Supp. 1988).
117. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, 18 - A § 5 - 501 (Supp. 1988).
118. Id.
119. HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 560:5-501 - 5-502 (1985); IOWA CODE ANN. § 144A.7 (West
Supp. 1988); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 20-107(d) (1987); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
7.70.065(1)(b) (Supp. 1989). See generally SOcIETY FOR THE RIGHT To DIE, ANALYSIS AND
CHART, supra note 82.
120. Evans v. Bellevue, N.Y.L.J., July 28, 1987, at 11, col. 1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.) (Sandifer,
J.). Evans is discussed infra at 30.
121. In re Peter, 108 N.J. 365, 529 A.2d 419 (1987).
122. Id.
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"although [New Jersey's durable power] statute does not specifically
authorize conveyance of durable authority to make medical
decisions, it should be interpreted that way."" In Mrs. Peter's case,
the court found that the durable power, along with other evidence,
constituted clear and convincing proof of her wish to forgo tube
feeding. 24 However, it emphasized that, with regard to permanently
unconscious nursing home patients, a designated decision-maker may
direct the withdrawal of treatment based on a substituted judgment,
without clear and convincing proof of the patient's wishes."z
State courts in Arizona and Colorado and a federal district

court in Texas also suggest, in dicta, that a power of attorney could
1
establish a patient's intent to decline life-sustaining treatment. 2
Even in those states where durable power statutes do not
expressly address health care decisions, where other laws do not

suggest such powers, and where courts have not spoken, there are
significant grounds for concluding that such powers may be
delegated. Almost all state durable power statutes are based on
either the Uniform Durable Power of Attorney Act (UDPAA),' 27 its
predecessor, Article V of the Uniform Probate Code," or the
123. Id. at 378, 529 A.2d at 426.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 385, 529 A.2d at 429.
126. Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 221, n.21, 741 P.2d 674, 688 n.21 (Ariz. 1987);
it re Rodas, No. 86PR139, slip op. at 34-35, 38 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Mesa Co. Jan. 22, 1987)
(Buss, J.); Newman v. William Beaumont Army Medical Center, No. EP-86-CA-276, slip op.
at 7 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 30, 1986). In Bartling v. Superior Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 209 Cal.
Rptr. 220 (Ct. App. 1984), the patient appointed his wife as his attorney-in-fact under a
durable power. However, the court approved the withdrawal of treatment on other grounds.
127. UN IF. DURABLE POWER OF ATORNEY Acr, 8A U.L.A. 275, 276 (1983). States with
durable power laws based on the Uniform Durable Power of Attorney Act include: Alabama,
California, Delaware, District of Columbia, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Massachussets, Nebraska,
North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. 8A U.L.A. 67 (West
Supp. 1983).
128. UNIF. PROBATE CODE Article V, 8 U.L.A. 511 (West 1983). States with durable
power laws based on the Uniform Probate Code include: Alaska, Arizona, Hawaii, Iowa,
Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, Rhode Island, South
Carolina, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, and Washington. See Note, supra note 56, at 1012,
n.175. Five of those states, Alaska, Maine, Nevada, Rhode Island, and Vermont, have statutes
or provisions authorizing and governing the delegation of health care decisions, obviating
reliance on the Uniform Probate Code for such authority. See infra 37-40.
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Model Special Power of Attorney for Small Property Interests Act
(MSPA-SPIA). 2 9 The Uniform Law Commissioners, in their
comments to a model act concerning health care decisions, stated
that the UDPAA already enables a principal to give an attorney-in-fact the power to make health care decisions.'

Since the

pertinent language in the UDPAA is identical to language in Article
V of the Uniform Probate Code,' the Commissioners' analysis
applies with equal force to all UDPAA and UPC states with that

provision.'
Finally, the MASPA-SPIA expressly approves the
creation of a durable power "to provide for the care of the
133
principal's person.'
Commentators familiar with the development of durable power
of attorney laws maintain that such statutes have always been broad
enough to support the delegation of authority over health care
decisions to an attorney-in-fact. 34 As one leading treatise concludes,
"durable power statutes, even those that do not expressly refer to
129. NATL CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, HANDBOOK AND
PROCEEDINGS OF ANNUAL CONFERENCE MEETING 275-81 (1964), reprinted in DRAFTING THE

DURABLE POWER, supra note 83, at 9.
130. MODEL HEALTH-CARE CONSENT ACT, 9 U.L.A. Part I, 457, 465 (Comment to section
6) (1988). Section 6 of the Model Health Care Consent Act recognizes an individual's right
"to appoint another as a health care representative." Id. at 464, § 6(a). The Law Commissioner's comment to that section states:
Section 6 is consistent with the Uniform Durable Power of Attorney Act. The
appointment made under this section would be given effect without this Act in a
jurisdiction which has enacted the Durable Power of Attorney Act. By incorporating
this section into the Act, the power of appointment will be brought to the attention
of persons who may not be aware of the Durable Power Act.
Id. at 466.
131. Compare UNIF. DURABLE POWER OF ATrORNEY AcI" § 2, 8A U.L.A. 280 (1983) with
UNIF. PROB. CODE § 5-502, 8 U.L.A. 514 (1983).
132. Note, supra note 56, at 1016-20. New York's durable power of attorney statute is
based on the UNIF. PROB. CODE § 5-501, 8 U.L.A. 514 (1983). H. LOWET, New York
Comments, in DRAFTING THE DURABLE POWER, supra note 83, at 240.
133. See supra note 129.
134. E.g., DRAFTING THE DURABLE POWER, supra note 83, at 6; Collin, supra note 83;
SOCIETY FOR THE RIGHT To DIE, supra note 41; Note, supra note 58, at 1016-20; ROBERTSON,
THE RIGHTS OF THE CRITICALLY ILL 111 (1983); MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, supra
note 68, at 159; Lynn, supra note 82; MYERS, supra note 84.
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health care, are sufficient to delegate health care powers to an
agent."' a5
3. The law in New York
In 1984, the State Health Commissioner requested the State
Attorney General to issue a formal opinion on whether, under New
York's durable power of attorney statute, a principal may designate
another person to make health care decisions in the event he or she
becomes incompetent." The Attorney General responded that a
durable power "cannot with prudence be used to delegate generally
to an agent the authority to make health care decisions on behalf
of an incompetent principal."3 7 However, it "may be used to delegate
specifically to an agent the responsibility to communicate the
principal's decision to decline medical treatment under defined
13 8
circumstances.'
Under this analysis, it is the principal's instructions, not the
delegation of decision-making powers, that has legal effect.3 9 As the
Task Force observed, "[t]his limitation, however, makes the power
equivalent to a living will and eliminates its real value: appointment
of an agent with authority to make decisions in the myriad of
circumstances that cannot be anticipated.""
A subsequent lower court decision, Evans v. Bellevue, took a
similarly narrow view of the role of durable powers of attorney for
135.
DRAFTING THE DURABLE POWER, supra note 83, at 34. The authors also provide
valuable model forms for drafting durable powers to convey health care decisions. One of tle
authors, Collin, provides further assistance to the drafter. See Collin, supra note 83.
136. Op. N.Y. Att'y Gen. F 84-16, 62-65 (1984).
137. Id. at 64-65.
138. Id. at 65.
139. In fact, the appointed person would more precisely be described as a "messenger"
than an "agent." As N.Y. JUR. 2D explains:
There is a clear distinction between a messenger and an agent. A messenger is
simply a medium of communication; he exercises no judgment of his own, he merely
repeats what is told him. An agent on the other hand, acts on his own judgment,
though of course within the limits of his instructions.
2 N.Y. JUR. 2D Agency § 9 (1979).
140. APPOINTING A HEALTH CARE AGENT, supra note 1, at 80.
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health care.'41 In that case, the friend of an unconscious AIDS

patient, armed with both a living will and durable power of attorney
from the patient, sought to have physicians withhold medication and
other treatment.' The court found that, under the circumstances of
the case, the living will did not provide clear and convincing
evidence of the patient's wish to forgo treatment. 4 3 It further held
that the power of attorney gave the agent no special authority to
interpret the agent's wishes."
In October 1988, a footnote in the court of appeals decision
in Matter of O'Connor added new weight to the argument for
delegating health care decisions by a power of attorney.'45 In that
note, the court explained that the recent enactment of a statute
authorizing "springing" powers of attorney" has "broadened" the
durable power of attorney. After a brief discussion, it concluded
that "there is therefore no longer any reason in principle why those
wishing to appoint another to express their specific or general
desires with respect to medical treatment, in the event they become
incompetent, may not do so formally through a power of attorney."'47
The central question raised by the court's discussion is whether
a principal may use a springing power of attorney to confer upon an
attorney-in-fact the authority to make health care decisions,
including the decision to direct the discontinuance of life-sustaining
treatment, even when there is less than clear and convincing
evidence of the principal's wish to forgo treatment. The court's
remarks, while ambiguous and not dispositive of this issue, at least
suggest a greater role for durable powers in health care than that
envisioned by the Attorney General.
141. Evans v. Bellevue Hosp., N.Y.L.J., July 28, 1987, at 11, col. 1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.)
(Sandifer, J.).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. In re O'Connor, 72 N.Y.2d 517, 528, n.2., 531 N.E.2d 607, 612 n.2., 534 N.Y.S.2d
886, 891, n.2 (1988).
146. 1988 N.Y. Laws 210 (codified as N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAw § 5-1602 (McKinney Supp.
1989)).
147. O'Connor, 72 N.Y.2d at 528, n.2., 531 N.E.2d at 612, n.2., 534 N.Y.S.2d at 891, n.2.
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4. Agency principles governing use of powers of attorney
Except as modified by statute, the common law of agency
generally governs the respective rights and obligations of principals,

attorneys-in-fact, and the third persons who deal with them." These
principles were forged in cases involving property management and,
in the absence of any caselaw, it is not certain to what extent courts
will draw upon them when deciding cases involving the delegation
of health care decisions. Yet, as shown below, agency principles
provide guidance and safeguards that are relevant and valuable, but
not entirely adequate, for the delegation of health care decisions.
In general, any person who has the capacity to perform a
delegable act may authorize an agent to perform that act, 149 and any
person can be appointed agent. 5 ' The agent's authority terminates

if either the principal or agent revokes or renounces the agency,'
152
and in other circumstances as well.

"An agent is a fiduciary with respect to matters within the scope
of [the] agency".'53 Consequently, the agent "must act in utmost good
faith and undivided loyalty towards the principal, and must act in

accordance with the highest principles of morality, fidelity, loyalty
148. "Agency" is the fiduciary relation which results from the manifestation of consent
by one person to another that the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his control, and
consent by the other so to act. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1(1) (1958). Meese v.
Miller, 79 A.D.2d 237, 436 N.Y.S.2d 496 (4th Dep't 1981). An attorney-in-fact is simply an
agent who acts pursuant to a power of attorney. Etterle v. Excelsior Ins. Co., 74 A.D.2d 436,
428 N.Y.S.2d 95 (4th Dep't 1980). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY (1958);
P. MECHAM, OUTLNES OF THE LAW OF AGENCY (1952); 3 AM. JUR. 2D Agency § 1 (1986);
2 N.Y. JuR. 2D Agency § 62 (1979).
149. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 20 (1958); 3 AM. JUR. 2D Agency §§ 9-12,
24 (1986). Cf. hz re Peter's Estate, 71 Misc. 2d 662, 336 N.Y.S.2d 712 (Sur. Ct. 1972). One
who can appoint an agent may use a durable power to enable another to act as attorney-infact. Wronkow v. Oakley, 133 N.Y. 505, 31 N.E. 521 (1892).
150.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 21(1) (1957); 3 AM. JUR. 2D Agency §§
13-14 (1986).
151. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 118,119 (1957). See Zaubler v. Picone, 100
A.D.2d 620, 473 N.Y.S.2d 580 (2d Dep't 1984).
152. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 105 (lapse of time), § 117 (mutual
consent), § 121 (death of agent), § 122 (loss of capacity of principal or agent) (1957).
153.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 13 (1957).
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and fair dealing."'' The agent may be held liable to the principal for
breaching this fiduciary obligation.'
With respect to the scope of the agent's authority, the Restate-

ment (Second) of Agency provides as follows: "An agent is
authorized to do, and to do only, what it is reasonable for him to
infer that the principal desires him to do in the light of the
principal's manifestations and the facts as he knows or should know
them at the time he acts."'56 This standard closely resembles the
substituted judgment standard generally applied to surrogates in

making decisions about health care, including life-sustaining
treatment.'
Settled principles also apply to the interpretation of agency
agreements, including powers of attorney. As a general rule, the

agreement is construed in accordance with the rules that govern the
interpretation of contracts.'

Thus, words are given their plain and

natural meaning in light of the principal's object and purpose.'

A

delegation of authority to perform particular acts includes authority

to perform acts that are incidental to it.'" However, a specific
delegation suggests that more general authority was not intended. 6'
154. In re DeBelardino's Estate, 77 Misc. 2d 253, 352 N.Y.S.2d 858 (Sur. Ct. 1974), aff'd,
47 A.D.2d 589, 363 N.Y.S.2d 974 (4th Dep't 1975).
155. Cristallina S.A. v. Christie, Manson & Woods Int'l., Inc., 117 A.D.2d 284, 502
N.Y.S.2d 165 (1st Dep't 1986). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 401 (1957).
156. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 33 (1957).
157. Under the substituted judgment standard a surrogate must "attempt to reach the
decision that the incapacitated person would make if he or she were able to choose."
DECIDING To FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT, supra note 30, at 132. To do so, the
surrogate should look for reliable evidence of the person's wishes, preferably prior expressions,
but also the person's general values, goals and desires. Id. at 133-34.
158. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 32 (1958). Similarly, powers of attorney are
to be construed in accordance with the rules for interpreting written instruments generally.
3 AM. JUR. 2D Agency § 30 (1986). However, statutes may prescribe a particular meaning for
powers of attorney clauses that meet statutory requirements. See e.g., N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW
§§ 5-1501(A)-(K) (McKinney 1978 and Supp. 1989).
159. See A. CORBIN, ON CONTRACrs § 542 (1952); 2 N.Y. JUR. 2D Agency § 66 (1979);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) AGENCY § 32 (Comment a) (1957). See also Benderson Dcv. Co.,
Inc. v. Schwab Bros. Trucking Inc., 64 A.D.2d 447, 409 N.Y.S.2d 890 (4th Dep't 1978).
160. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 35 (1957).
161. Id. § 37(b); See Gaughan v. Nickoloff, 28 Misc. 2d 555, 557, 214 N.Y.S.2d 487 (Sup.
Ct. 1961) (quoting 2 AM. JUR. Agency § 32).
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An agent can be held liable to the principal for any loss
sustained as a result of the failure to follow the principal's instruc-

tions."' However, if the instructions are ambiguous, the agent will
not be liable for adopting in good faith a reasonable construction.163
It is often held that third persons, in relying upon an agent's
claim of authority, have a duty to ascertain the agent's powers."
Where there is a power of attorney, that duty involves inspecting
the document and abiding by the limitations in it." However, a
New York appellate court recently held that "the duty of reasonable
inquiry is owed by the third person to himself, not to the putative

principal."' " The court thus rejected the contention that a third
party may be held liable to the principal for failing to ascertain that
the agent was acting in excess of authority. 67
In general, a power of attorney is a device to enable, not to
require, those who deal with the principal to do so through an
agent." However, in some instances states have acted to compel
third persons to honor powers of attorney that meet certain
requirements. 6 9
As the foregoing discussion reveals, agency principles meaningfully apply to the use of powers of attorney to delegate health care
P. MECHAM, supra note 135, § 515.
163. Id. § 519.; See also Miles Mfg. Co. v. North German Lloyd S.S. Co., 89 Misc. 376,
151 N.Y.S. 881, 883 (Sup. Ct. 1915).
164. 2 N.Y. JUR. 2D Agency § 74 (1979). See Metallizing Eng'g Co., Inc. v. B. Simon, Inc.,
64 F. Supp. 848 (W.D.N.Y. 1945); Maidgold Assoc. v. New York, 64 N.Y.2d 1121, 479
N.E.2d 807, 490 N.Y.S.2d 171 (1985); Ford v. Unity Hosp., 32 NY.2d 464, 299 N.E.2d 659,
346 N.Y.S.2d 238 (1973); Munn v. Boasberg, 292 N.Y.2d 5, 53 N.E.2d 371 (1945).
165. 2 N.Y. JUR. 2D Agency § 78 (1979). See Craighead v. Peterson, 72 N.Y. 279 (1878).
166. William Penn Life Ins. Co. of New York v. Irving Trust Co., N.Y.L.J., Mar. 7, 1989,
at 23, col. 6 (App. Div., 1st Dep't).
167. Id.
168. See Bos, The Durable Power of Attorney, 64 MICH. BJ., 690, 690-91 (July 1985)
("The power is effective only to the extent that the agent can persuade third persons to
permit him or her to transact business or make personal care decisions on behalf of the
principal." Id.); 2A C.J.S. AGENCY § 168 (1955) ("It has been held that no one is bound to
deal with an agent." Id.). See also Strauss & Wolf, Durable Power of Attorney: New York
Applications, N.Y.L.J. June 3, 1985, at 17, col. 4 (noting that banks, the IRS and insurance
companies often refuse to honor valid powers of attorney).
169. E.g., N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAw § 5-1504 (McKinney 1989) (requiring banks to honor
duly executed statutory short form powers of attorney).
162.
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decisions. However, there are special problems relating to the
delegation of health care decisions that are not adequately addressed
by existing agency principles, a point developed in the analysis of the
New York State Task Force's Health Care Proxy proposal. 7 '
B. Living Will Proxy Provisions
Another approach to authorizing the delegation of health care
decisions, taken by nine state legislatures, is to include in their living
will statute provisions that empower an adult to designate a person
to refuse treatment on the adult's behalf. The living will statutes of
Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Iowa, Louisiana, Texas, Utah, Virginia,
and Wyoming take this approach. 7 '
These nine living will statutes vary in the attention they accord
to the proxy provisions. Arkansas' statute, for example, addresses
the matter relatively thoroughly. It defines "health care proxy," sets
forth a suggested appointment form, and provides for the proxy's
authority to commence when the patient, "in the opinion of the
attending physician, is permanently unconscious, incompetent or
otherwise mentally or physically incapable of communication."'" The
Texas living will statute, adopting a more abbreviated approach,
simply states that a living will "may include other directions,
including a designation of another person to make a treatment
decision in accordance with . . . this Act for the declarant if the

declarant is comatose, incompetent or otherwise mentally or
physically incapable of communication."'7
170. See infra 38-47.
171. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 20-17-202 (Supp. 1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16 § 2502(b)
(1983); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 765.05(2), 765.07 (West 1986); IOWA CODE ANN. § 144A.7 (West
Supp. 1988); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.58.3(c)(1) (West Supp. 1988); TEx. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE ANN. § 4590h(4)(b) (Vernon 1989); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-1106 (Supp.
1988); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54.1-2984 (1988); Wyo. STAT. § 35-22-103 (1988). The Idaho and
Minnesota living will statutes arguably could be included in this list. IDAHO CODE § 39-4505
(Supp. 1988); Act of Mar. 3, 1989 Minn. Laws 3. However, those statutes contain provisions
that are sufficiently comprehensive to warrant inclusion in the "health care proxy statute"
category. See infra, note 175.
172. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 20-17-202 (Supp. 1987).
173. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 4590h(3)(e) (Vernon 1989).
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One common attribute of proxy provisions in living will statutes
is that they only relate to decisions about life-sustaining treatment.
In Florida for instance, the living will statute gives no direct support
for appointing a health care agent to make more routine health care
decisions." 4 Ironically, then, citizens of some states have a clearer

right to delegate the power to consent to remove life-supports than
the power to consent to remove an inflamed appendix.
C. Health Care Proxy Legislation

In 1983, California became the first state to expressly authorize
the appointment of a health care agent by means of a comprehensive statute devoted to the issue, the Durable Power of Attorney for
Health Care Act.175 By early 1989, nine jurisdictions -- California,
District of Columbia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Minnesota, Nevada,
Rhode Island, and Vermont had enacted comprehensive health care
proxy legislation. 6
174. Id. Cf. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 20-17-201(10)(Supp. 1987) (defining "health care proxy"
as person appointed "to make health care decisions including the withholding or withdrawal
of life-sustaining treatment ....
Id.).
175. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 2430-2444 (West Supp. 1989). See generally Steinbrook & Lo,
Decision Making for Incompetent Patients for Incompetent Patients by Designated Proxy:
California's New Law, 310 N. ENG. J. MED. 1598, (1984); CAL. MEDICAL ASS'N, WHAT
PHYSICIANS SHOULD KNOW ABOUT THE DURABLE POWER OF ATrORNEY FOR HEALTH CARE
(1986).
176. CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 2430-2444 (West Supp. 1989); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 21-2205 2209 (Supp. 1989); IDAHO CODE § 39-4505 (Supp. 1988); ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para.
804 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-8-12.1 - .12 (Burns Supp. 1988); Act of
Mar. 3, 1989, 1989 Minn. Laws 3; NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 449.800 - 860 (1987); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 23-4.10 (Supp. 1988); VT. STAT. ANN. lit. 14, §§ 3451 - 3467 (Supp. 1988).
The District of Columbia statute also authorizes surrogate decision-making for patients
who did not appoint an agent. The Indiana statute is based on the Model Health Care
Consent Act, MODEL HEALTH-CARE CONSENT ACT, 9 U.L.A. Part I, 453 (1988), and governs
matters other than the appointment of an agent. The Vermont statute is modeled, in large
part, after the Health Care Proxy proposal advanced by the New York State Task Force on
Life and the Law. See infra 40-49.
In 1988, bills to authorize the delegation of health care decisions were proposed in
Alabama, Kansas, Massachussets, Michigan, Missouri, New York, and Ohio. See SOCIETY FOR
THE RIGHT To DIE, 1988 PROPOSED HEALTH CARE PROXY ACTS OR AMENDMENTS WHICH
CONCERN LIFE SUSTAINING TREATMENT (Oct. 26, 1988). As of mid-February 1989, health care
proxy bills have been introduced in Connecticut, Kansas, Michigan, Missouri, New Hampshire,
Ohio, Oregon, and Wyoming. See SOCIETY FOR THE RIGHT To DIE, 1989 PROPOSED HEALTH
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The nine statutes recognize an individual's right to appoint an
agent to make health care decisions by creating a special document,
for present purposes, a "health care proxy." Illinois' statute states
that it is not exclusive of other means of delegating such authority
to an agent." California's statute, purports to set forth exclusive
requirements for appointing a health care agent.'78
All nine statutes prescribe execution requirements for the health
care proxy. California's requirements are the most restrictive and
complex: it imposes numerous limitations on witness eligibility for all
proxies, and requires a state-designated patient advocate or
ombudsman to witness proxies created by nursing home residents.179
Illinois' law, in contrast, simply requires the principal's notarized
signature."8 In all states18"' but Indiana and Minnesota,"u the health
care provider is ineligible to be named as the health care agent.
Another feature common to all the statutes is a proxy form that
either may... or must"M be used. All the statutory forms contain a
description or warning about the breadth of power an agent can
exercise." In Illinois, Nevada, and Vermont, the forms provide
examples of language that a principal might wish to, or must
substantially, use to forgo or insist upon life-sustaining treatment.'8
CARE PROXY AmrS (Feb. 15, 1989).
177. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, paras. 804-1, 804-10 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988).
178. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2432(a) (West Supp. 1989).
179. Id. §§ 2432(d)-() (West Supp. 1989).
180. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para. 804-10 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988).
181. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2432(b) (West Supp. 1989); D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-2209(b) (Supp.
1989); IDAHO CODE § 39-4505 (Supp. 1988); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para. 804-5 (SmithHurd Supp. 1988); NEV. REV. STAT. § 449.820(1) (1987); R.I. GEN. LAws § 23-4.10-2(1)
(Supp. 1988); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 3455 (Supp. 1988).
182. IND. CODE ANN. § 16-8-12.7 (Burns Supp. 1988); Act of March 3, 1989, 1989 Minn.
Laws 3.
183'. E.g., IDAHO CODE § 39-4505 (Supp. 1988); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para.
804-10(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988).
184. E.g., Act of Mar. 3,1989,1989 Minn. Laws 3 §4; R.I. GEN. LAws § 23-4.10-2 (Supp.
1988); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 3466 (Supp. 1988).
185. E.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 2433 (West Supp. 1989); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para.
804-10 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988); R.I. GEN. LAws § 23-4.10-2 (Supp. 1988); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 14, § 3465 (Supp. 1988).
186. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para. 804-10(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 449.830 (1987); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 3466 (Supp. 1988).
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Other states simply provide a blank space for individualized
instructions."8 7
In general, the statutes enable the agent to make any health
care decision the principal lawfully could have made, subject to any
limitations or instructions by the principal.1" Thus, under all nine
statutes, the agent has the authority to consent to the withdrawal or
withholding of life-sustaining treatment on behalf of the principal,
unless such power is excluded. California and Illinois even empower
the agent to make decisions about a deceased patient, including
whether organs will be donated, whether an autopsy will be
performed, and what method will be used in disposing of the body."8
There are, however, some exceptions to the rule that the agent's
powers are equivalent to the principal's. California and Nevada
expressly preclude the agent from consenting to the commitment of
the principal in a mental health facility, convulsive treatments,
psycho-surgery, sterilization, and abortion."9 Illinois makes the
agent's authority "subject to the provider's right to administer
treatment for the patient's comfort care or alleviation of pain." 9 '
Moreover, some of the statutes expressly require adherence to the
substituted judgment/best interests standard."9 Thus, California
provides that the agent is obligated "to act consistent with the
desires of the principal . .. . or, if the principal's desires are

unknown, to act in the best interests of the principal."'93
Most of the health care proxy statutes provide that the agent's
authority is effective only when the principal is incapable of making
187. E.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4.10-2(4) (Supp. 1988).
188. E.g., Act of Mar. 3, 1989, 1989 Minn. Laws 3 § 6(b)(2); R.I. GEN. LAWS §
23-4.10-2(3) (Supp. 1988); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 3453(a) (Supp. 1988).
189. CAL. CIv. CODE § 2434(b) (West Supp. 1989); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para.
804-7(d) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988). Idaho also enables the agent to consent to organ donation.
IDAHO CODE § 39-4505 (Supp. 1988).
190. CAL CIV. CODE § 2435 (West Supp. 1989); NEv. RaV. STAT. § 449.850 (1987).
191. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para. 804-7(b) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988).
192. E.g., Act of Mar. 3,1989, 1989 Minn. Laws 3 § 6(b)(2); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4.10-2
(Supp. 1988); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14 § 3453(b) (Supp. 1988).
193. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2434(b) (West Supp. 1989).
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health care decisions."9 California's law, for instance, states that the
agent cannot make any decision "if the principal is able to give
informed consent with respect to that decision."" Illinois, in
contrast, affords the principal a full range of options, from empowering the agent to act immediately, to specifying the event or time
when the agency begins.1"
Other clauses found in most or all of the health care proxy laws
address the revocation 97 or expiration" of the proxy, the agent's
access to health care information and records,'" the appointment of
alternate agents,"° the immunity of health care providers and
agents,2"' and criminal penalties for violations such as forging or
destroying a patient's proxy.' ° In addition, Illinois, Minnesota, and

Vermont expressly allow a health care provider who objects to the
agent's decisions to transfer the care of the patient to another
provider.23
V. Ti-

NEW YORK HEALTH CARE PROXY PROPOSAL

In July 1987, the New York State Task Force on Life and the
Law recommended the enactment of "Health Care Proxy Legislation"
to clearly establish the right of an adult to appoint a health care
194. E.g.., CAL. CIv. CODE § 2434(a) (West Supp. 1989); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-8-12.6(f)
(Burns Supp. 1988).
195. CAL. CIv. CODE § 2434(a) (West Supp. 1989).
196. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch 110 1/2, para. 802-4(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988).
197. E.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 16-8-12.60) (Burns Supp. 1988); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2,
para. 804-6 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988).
198. E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 2436.5 (West Supp. 1989) (seven years); R.I. GEN. LAWS §
23-4.10-2,7 (Supp. 1988) (seven years).
199. E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 2436 (West Supp. 1989); R.I. GEN. LAws § 23-4.10-2,5
(Supp. 1988).
200. E.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 440.805 (1987); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4.10-2,8 (Supp. 1988).
201. E.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 16-8-12.9 (Burns Supp. 1988); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14 § 3462
(Supp. 1988).
202. E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 2442 (West Supp. 1989); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2 para.
804-9 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988).
203. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para. 804-8(b) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988); Act of Mar.
3, 1989, 1989 Minn. Law 3 §§ 6, 7; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14 § 3459(b) (Supp. 1988).
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agent.2' A bill embodying the Task Force's recommendations was
introduced in the 1988 session of the State Legislature by Senator
Mary Goodhue and Assemblyman Richard Gottfried. 5 The bill
contained a number of modifications and additions to the Task
Force proposal suggested by interested individuals, organizations and
agencies, to the Task Force proposal.2'
While no action was taken on the proposed legislation in 1988,
a health care proxy bill will be considered by the Legislature in the
forthcoming 1989 session. As of this writing, however, a 1989 bill
has not yet been introduced. Because discussions about the 1989
Health Care Proxy bill are still taking place, this chapter analyzes
the original Task Force proposal.
The Task Force's Health Care Proxy Proposal is set forth in the
appendix to this article. 7
A. Summary And Analysis
1. Requirements for appointing health care agent
The proposal recognizes that a competent adult has the right
to appoint a health care agent by creating a health care proxy.'
No special form is required, but the writing must contain specified
elements to be valid.' For example, it must identify the principal
and agent and indicate that the principal intends the agent to have
204. APPOINTING A HEALTH CARE AGENT, supra note 1. See Sullivan, New York Panel
Urges Widening Patients' Rights N.Y. Times, Sept. 30, 1987, at 1, col. 1.
205. S. 6967 / A. 8955, N.Y. (Feb. 9, 1988).
206. For example, the 1988 bill contained provisions regarding: appointing an alternate
agent, id. § 2981.6; witnessing requirements for patients with mental illnesses or developmental
disabilities, id. §§ 2981.2(b), (c); determining the incapacity of patients with mental illnesses
or developmental disabilities, id. 99 2983.1(b), (c); confirming a patient's incapacity for
subsequent treatment decisions, id. § 2983.5; the effect of other written instructions by the
principal id. § 2985.1(d); the lack of effect of the statute on other rights, id. § 2989; and
court proceedings. Id. § 2992.
207. See infra Appendix 49-61 [hereinafter Appendix].
208. Id. § 2.1(a).
209. Id. § 5.
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authority to make health care decisions on the principal's behalf.21
The Task Force proposed a model form which could be used as a
health care proxy.'
The proxy must be signed by the principal before two adult
witnesses."' The person who is to be the health care agent is not
eligible to witness the principal's signature." 3 The witness requirement adds greater assurance about the authenticity of the document
and seriousness of the principal than those afforded by a power of
attorney. At the same time, the proposal eschews the complex,
unduly restrictive approach of some living will and health care proxy
statutes.2"4 In this, as in other provisions, the proposal strives to
achieve a balance between the need for procedural protections and
the need to make the health care proxy device simple, accessible,
and free of traps for the unwary.
The principal has broad discretion in appointing a health care
agent. However, if the principal is hospitalized when creating the
proxy, he or she may not appoint an operator, administrator, or
employee of the hospital as health care agent." 5 Empowering the
person who provides treatment to decide unilaterally whether the
patient accepts it raises significant concerns. A provider-agent could
be subject to institutional pressures or professional perspectives
which can impair the agent's ability to assert the patient's wishes
or interests. For similar reasons, a physician may not simultaneously
be both the principal's agent and attending physician.2"6
In a sense, the principal's family members also have conflicts
of interest: they may bear part or all of the expense of treatment or
210.
211.

Id.
Id. at 61 (Health Care Proxy Form).

212. Id. § 2.2.
213. Id.
214.
See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 2432(d)-(f) (West Supp. 1989) (witness restrictions
under California Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care Act).
215. See infra Appendix § 2.3(a). Although the proposal does not permit the health care
provider to be appointed agent, it would not impair or otherwise affect the legality of
providing care to an incapable patient who does not have an agent. Thus, existing exceptions
to the informed consent requirement (e.g., emergency, waiver) would continue to apply. See
N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAw § 2805-d (McKinney 1985). See generally Meisel, supra note 51.
216. See infra Appendix § 2.3(c).
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stand to inherit from the principal's estate. They are also more likely
to be influenced by emotional or personal considerations in their
treatment decisions. Nevertheless, the proxy proposal does not
render family members ineligible from being health care agents:
these are people who, for social and cultural reasons, are usually
expected to make decisions for an incapable patient, and whom most
persons would want to make such decisions for them.217 Indeed, one
benefit of the health care proxy proposal is that it enables those
adults who want to select someone from outside the family unit to
do so."'
2. Commencement of agent's authority
Under the health care proxy proposal, the agent's authority
commences when the attending physician determines that the patient
lacks capacity to make health care decisions.219 Thus, the proposal
authorizes only a "springing power"; it does not allow an agent to
make decisions while the principal is decision-capable.
This seemingly simple issue of the commencement of the agent's
authority was the subject of considerable debate within the Task
Force, and resulted in a four person dissenting opinion in their
report.' The minority believed that an adult should have the option
of making their proxy effective upon execution."' They argued that
the option would enable frail patients to obtain decision-making
assistance in advance of a loss of capacity.'m They further contended
that the option would enable an agent to act without a cumbersome
and degrading determination of the patient's incapacity.'
Significantly, the minority did not propose enabling the principal to
217. See generally Newman, Treatment Refusals for the Critically 11: ProposedRules for the
Family, the Physician and the State, 3 N.Y.L. SCH. HUM. RTS. ANN. 35, 44-51 (1985)
(discussing role of family in medical treatment decisions).
218. See note 68-69 and accompanying discussion.
219. See infra Appendix § 2.4.
220. APPOlnNG A HEALTH CARE AGENT, supra note 1, at 141-45.
221. Id, *at141.
222. Id
223. Id at 142.
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avoid all participation in treatment decisions. Instead, under the
minority proposal, the health care provider would still have to seek
treatment decisions from the principal, so long as the principal has
capacity. 4 Only if the principal then indicates a desire not to make
the decision can the provider turn to the agent.'
The majority endorsed only the springing power approach.'
They contended that allowing an agent to make decisions for a
capable patient would erode patient autonomy and disrupt and
encumber the physician-patient relationship. Moreover, since the
alternative proposal requires consultation with the patient only as
long the patient has capacity, it does not avoid the central problem
of determining incapacity. Finally, they pointed out that the capable
patient already has adequate authority under law to "waive" his or
her right to decide. 7
The health care proxy bill's exclusive reliance on a springing
power distinguishes it from general powers of attorney, which can
be made effective immediately or can spring upon a contingency
specified by the principal.'
3. Determination of incapacity
Under the Health Care Proxy proposal, a patient's incapacity,
and consequently the agent's authority, is established by the
attending physician to a reasonable degree of medical certainty.'
For patients with mental illnesses or developmental disabilities, the
physician must have or consult with a physician who has specialized
training or experience.' Notice of the determination of incapacity
must then be given to the principal, orally and in writing, but only
224. Id at 145.
225. Id. at 145.
226. Id. at 95-100. See also Rizzo, The Living Will: Does It Protect the Rights of the
Terminally I11P, N.Y.S. J. MED. 72, 78 (Feb. 1989).
227. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-d.4(b) (McKinney 1985) (waiver is a statutory
defense to an action for treatment without informed consent).
228. See N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW §§ 5.1601-02 (McKinney 1989).
229. See infra Appendix § 4.1(a).
230. Id. § 4.1(b).
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if there is any indication of the patient's ability to comprehend the
notice. 1 This is a basic protection to ensure that the health care
agency is used to secure the patient's health care choices, not to
avoid them. Notice also must be given to the agent and, if the
patient is in or from a mental hygiene facility, to the facility
director. 231
4. Agent's authority and obligations
The Health Care Proxy proposal enables an adult to delegate
up to the full measure of his or her health care decision-making
authority to an agent. It states "[s]ubject to any express limitations
in the health care proxy, an agent shall have the authority to make
any and all health care decisions on the principal's behalf, that the
principal could make, including decisions about life-sustaining
treatment."' 33
The rationale for this principle is straightforward and
compelling: the object of preserving patient self-determination
beyond the loss of capacity can be achieved only if the agent can
exercise those powers the patient could have exercised if decision-capable.' To the extent the agent is restrained by law from making
decisions the patient could have, and would have, made, the
patient's treatment wishes cannot be secured.
While the agent's authority is broad, it is by no means limitless
or unreviewable. First, the agent cannot make any decision the
principal could not have made. 5 Thus, in those circumstances where
the principal, if capable, could not have refused treatment, the agent
cannot refuse treatment on the principal's behalf. Moreover, the
principal may attach specific limitations or instructions to the
231. Id. § 4.2.
232. Id.
233. Id. § 3.1. This principle is embodied in most health care proxy statutes, although
some exclude the delegation of reproductive and mental health procedures. See supra note
174.
234. See APPoINTING A HEALTH CARE AGENT, supra note 1, at 89-90.
235. See infra Appendix § 3.1.
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proxy.' For instance, the principal may provide that the agent may
under no circumstances direct the withdrawal of artificial nutrition
and hydration. The agent would be bound by such limitations, and
the health care provider could decline to carry out decisions that
exceed those limitations."'
Furthermore the agent is expressly bound by the substituted
judgment/best interests standard.' That is, in making any health care
decisions, the agent must first strive to decide in accordance the
principal's wishes, including the principal's religious or moral beliefs.
If the principal's wishes are unknown and cannot with reasonable
diligence be ascertained, the agent is required to choose the course
that serves the principal's best interests. The patient's family or
provider could, if need be, commence suit to oust an agent or
override an agent's decision for failure to adhere to these standards.' 39
The health care agent has priority over any other decision-maker except the principal himself."4 Thus the agent's decision, by virtue
of his or her formal selection by the patient, has precedence over
a decision by the patient's relatives, or even a court-appointed
committee. The principal, however, retains the right to override an
agent's decision, even though he may have been found to lack
capacity by a physician."1 As the New York Court of Appeals
decision, Rivers v. Katz, establishes, a nonjudicial determination of
incapacity is not a constitutionally sufficient basis to override a
patient's medical treatment decisions. 42
236.

Id. §§ 2.5(a)(iii), 5.2.

237. See, e.g., Id. § 5.2 (provider has duty to honor agent's decision "subject to any
limitations in the health care proxy" Id.).
238. Id. § 3.2.
239. APPOINTING A HEALTH CARE AGENT, supra note 1, at 120.
240. See infra Appendix § 3.4.
241. Id. § 4.4.
242. Rivers v. Katz, 67 N.Y.2d 485, 492-94, 495 N.E.2d 337, 340-42, 504 N.Y.S.2d 72,
78-79 (1986).
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5. Provider's obligations
The proposal would require health care providers to "comply
with health care decisions made by an agent ... to the same extent

as if such decisions had been made by the principal" subject to
whatever limitations the principal specified and the principal's own
priority. 43 This clarifies that providers cannot decline to recognize
a patient's duly appointed health care agent2" The term "health
care provider" is defined broadly and includes individuals and
facilities licensed to treat patients.2 45 Thus, the agent can act in any
setting in which a provider treats a patient, not just institutional
settings.
6. Immunity
The proxy proposal would confer explicit immunity on health
care providers for carrying out in good faith a decision by an
agent. ' The immunity clause is necessary to make patient's choices
interests, rather than liability concerns, the primary consideration in
treatment decisions.2 47 Thus, the provider who, with the consent the
health care agent, withdraws life-sustaining treatment from a
terminally ill and unconscious patient need no longer fear the
legendary "long-lost son from California" who might show up later
and sue. The immunity clause also protects the provider from
administrative sanctions and criminal prosecution. It would not,
however, shield a health care professional who is negligent in the
provision of medical care.
Health care providers in New York who rely on a decision by
an attorney-in-fact under a springing power of attorney do not have
the benefit of a statutory immunity clause. Of course, the absence
of statutory immunity does not mean that honoring an
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.

See infra Appendix § 5.2.
See supra note 153.
See infra Appendix § 1.5.
Id. § 7.1.
APPOINTING A HEALTH CARE AGENT, smpra note 1, at 122.
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attorney-in-fact's decision always entails a significant risk of liability
or other legal repercussion. But because there is uncertainty about
relying on health care decisions by an attorney-in-fact, more so than
in honoring a living will, explicit recognition of immunity is a
reasonable step to encourage professionals to honor agent's
decisions.
7. Other features
The Health Care Proxy proposal contains several other features
that are not present in the delegation of health care decisions by a
springing power of attorney. The proposal requires residential health
care facilities and mental hygiene facilities to establish special
procedures to ensure that residents who create health care proxies
do so knowingly and voluntarily.2' It empowers the Commissioner
of Health to promulgate regulations relating to health care proxies. 49
The proposal requires a statement of patient's rights under the
statute to be posted in hospitals and distributed to patients and
staff."' However, the proposal prohibits anyone from requiring (or
prohibiting) the execution of a health care proxy as a condition for
receiving health care services." The statutory objective is to enable,
not require, adults to appoint agents.
B. Need for the Health Care Proxy Bill
The O'Connor footnote suggests that one may already be able
to delegate health care decisions to an attorney-in-fact by using a
springing power of attorney."2 Even so, enactment of the health care
proxy proposal is enormously important for New Yorkers. First, it
establishes unequivocally that an adult has the right to appoint a
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
891, n.2

See infra Appendix § 11.
Id. § 12.
Id. § 13.
Id. § 9.
In re O'Connor, 72 N.Y.2d 517, 528, n.2, 531 N.E.2d 612, n.2, 534 N.Y.S.2d 886,
(1988).
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health care agent who can make any decision, including decisions
about

life-sustaining

treatment, the adult could

have

made.

Enactment would end any uncertainty on this question.
Even more important, the proxy proposal governs the appointment of health care agents in a more careful, responsible manner
than general agency principles. There are special issues raised by
designating another to make health care decisions, issues that are

not well-addressed by agency principles." Who can act as health
care agent? When should the agent's authority commence? What
obligations and liability protection should health care professionals

have? These issues and others are addressed directly and appropriately by the proxy proposal.
The bill based on the proxy proposal has received widespread
support in New York from various interested communities and
individuals." Governor Cuomo called for enactment of the bill in his
1988 and 1989 State of the State Addresses." The bill has also
received editorial support from the New York Times,"' Newsday, z"
the Albany 5Knickerbocker News, z" and the Gannett Westchester
Newspaper."

VL CONCLUSION

In New York, decision-capable adults have a broad right to
accept or refuse medical care. However, once an adult loses the
253. The President's Commission also acknowledged that special statutory provisions may
be needed in connection with proxy appointments. MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, supra
note 68, at 160-66.
254. Public Hearings before the N.Y Senate Comm'n on Health and the N.Y Assembly
Comm'n on Health on Proposed Health Care Agent Bill (Jan. 27, 1988 and Feb. 4, 1988)
(transcript).
255. Annual Message to the New York Legislature by Gov. Cuomo at 76-77 (Jan. 6,
1988); Annual Message to the New York Legislature by Gov. Cuomo at 43 (Jan. 4, 1989).
256. Taking Charge of Life, and Death, N.Y. Times, Oct. 12, 1987, at A18, col. 1.
257. A Model Law on Living Wills in New York, Newsday, Oct. 4, 1987, Ideas section at
3, col. 1; Right-to-Die Choices Belong to Patients, Families, Newsday, Oct. 22, 1988 at 16.
258. Dying With Dignity, Knickerbocker News, Oct. 24, 1987 § A, at 10, col. 1.
259. Toward Widening Patients' Rights, Gannett Westchester Newspapers, Oct. 6, 1987,
at A10, col. 1.
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capacity to make decisions directly, he or she has little assurance
that his wishes will be honored or interests protected, particularly
for decisions about life-sustaining treatment.
As a general rule in New York, life-sustaining treatment can be
withheld or discontinued from an incapable patient if there is clear
and convincing evidence that the patient would want to forgo
treatment under the circumstances. Yet it is difficult for individuals
to predict future health care decisions and provide instructions that
are sufficient to satisfy the clear and convincing standard.
The best way to enable an adult to protect his or her wishes
and interests in the event of a subsequent loss of capacity is to
recognize the right to delegate to a trusted family member or friend
the authority to speak for the adult when he or she loses the ability
to make health care decisions directly. The appointed "health care
agent" must then strive to make decisions in accordance with the
adult's wishes or interests, but can extrapolate the adult's decision
in unforeseen circumstances. Numerous states already enable their
citizens to appoint a decision-maker, either through their durable
power of attorney statutes, living will statutes, or special health care
proxy statutes.
The Health Care Proxy proposal, developed by the New York
State Task Force on Life and the Law, responds directly to the
perceived and real inadequacies of current law. It unequivocally
recognizes the right of an adult to appoint a health care agent, and
obligates health care providers to honor that right and protects them
for doing so. Moreover, the proposal governs the use of health care
proxies in more careful, responsible manner than agency principles
govern the use of durable powers of attorney for health care
decisions.

Appendix
Health Care Proxy
Proposed Legislation"
Section
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Definitions.
Appointment of Health Care Agent; Health Care Proxy.
Rights and Duties of Agent.
Determination of Lack of Capacity to Make ,Health Care
Decisions for the Purpose of Empowering Agent.
Provider's Obligation.
Revocation.
Immunity.
Liability for Health Care Costs.
Requiring or Prohibiting Execution of a Health Care Proxy.
Proxies Executed in Other States.
Creation and Use of Proxies in Residential Health Care and
Mental Hygiene Facilities.
Regulations.
Rights to be Publicized.

§ 1. Definitions.
1. 'Attendingphysician" means the physician, selected by or assigned

to a patient, who has primary responsibility for the treatment and
care of the patient.
2. "Capacity to make health care decisions" means the ability to
understand and appreciate the nature and consequences of health
care decisions, including the benefits and risks of and alternatives
to any proposed health care, and to reach an informed decision.
*
Reprinted from NEw YoRK STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND
THE LAW
LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT' MAKING DECISIONs AND APPOINTING A HEALTH CARE AGENT
(1987) at 149-59.
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3. "Health care" means any treatment, service or procedure to
diagnose or treat an individual's physical or mental condition.
4. "Healthcare agent" or "agent"means an adult to whom authority
to make health care decisions is delegated under a health care
proxy.
5. "Health care provider" means an individual or facility licensed,
certified, or otherwise authorized or permitted by law to
administer health care in the ordinary course of business or
professional practice.
6. "Healthcare proxy" means a document delegating to an agent the
authority to make health care decisions, executed in accordance
with the requirements of this article.
7. "Hospital"means a hospital and a residential health care facility
as defined in section 2801 of the Public Health Law, and a
mental hygiene facility as defined in paragraph (8) of this section.
8. "Mentalhygiene facility" means a facility operated or licensed by
the Office of Mental Health or the Office of Mental Retardation
and Developmental Disabilities.
9. "Principal"means a person who has executed a health care proxy.
10. "Residentialhealth care facility" means a residential health care
facility as defined in section 2801.3 of the Public Health Law.
§ 2. Appointment of Health Care Agent; Health Care Proxy.
1. Right to appoint agent; presumption of competence.
(a) A competent adult has the right to appoint a health care
agent.
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(b) For the purpose of this section, every adult shall be reuncd
competent unless determined otherwise pursuant tocouttoder.
2. Health care proxy; execution; witnesses. A competent adult may
appoint a health care agent by a health care proxy, signed by or
at the direction of the adult in the presence of two subscribing
adult witnesses. The witnesses shall affirm that the principal
appeared to be of sound mind and free from duress. The person
appointed as agent shall not act as witness to execution of the
health care proxy.
3. Restrictions on who may be appointed agent.
(a) An operator, administrator or employee of a hospital may not
be appointed as health care agent by any person who, at the
time of the appointment, is a patient or resident of, or has
applied for admission to, such hospital.
(b) The restriction in paragraph (a) of this subdivision shall not
apply to:
(i)

an operator, administrator or employee of a mental
hygiene facility, provided the person appointed agent
gives notice of the appointment to Mental Hygiene Legal
Service promptly after learning of the appointment and
before acting as agent;

(ii) an operator, administrator or employee of a hospital who
is related to the principal by blood, marriage or adoption;
(iii) a physician, subject to the limitation set forth in
paragraph (c) of this subdivision.
(c) If a physician is appointed agent, the physician shall not act
as the patient's attending physician after the authority under
the health care proxy commences, unless the physician declines
the appointment as agent at or before such time.
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4. Commencement of agent's authority. The agent's authority shall
commence upon a determination, made pursuant to section 4 of
this article, that the principal lacks capacity to make health care
decisions.
5. Contents and form of health care proxy.
(a) The health care proxy shall:
(i)

identify the principal and agent;

(ii) indicate that the principal intends the agent to have
authority to make health care decisions on the principal's
behalf;
(iii) describe the limitations, if any, that the principal intends
to impose upon the agent's authority; and
(iv) indicate that the agent's authority shall become effective
if the principal subsequently loses capacity to make health
care decisions.
(b) The health care proxy shall be executed in accordance with
the requirements of section 2.2 and may, but need not, be in
the form set forth in the Appendix to this article.

§ 3. Rights and Duties of Agent
1. Scope of authority. Subject to any express limitations in the health
care proxy, an agent shall have the authority to make any and all
health care decisions on the principal's behalf that the principal
could make, including decisions about life-sustaining treatment.
2. Decision-making standard. After consultation with health care
providers, the agent shall make health care decisions: (a) in
accordance with the agent's assessment of the principal's wishes,
including the principal's religious and moral beliefs, or (b) if the
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principal's wishes are unknown, in accordance with the agent's
assessment of the principal's best interests.
3. Right to receive infonnation. Notwithstanding any law to the
contrary, the agent shall have the right to receive medical
information necessary to make informed decisions regarding the
principal's health care.
4. Priority over other surrogates. Health care decisions by an agent
on a principal's behalf shall have priority over decisions by any
other person, except as otherwise provided in the health care
proxy or in section 4.4 of this article.

§ 4. Determination of Lack of Capacity to Make Health Care
Decisions for the Purpose of Empowering Agent.
1. Determination by attending physician.
(a) A determination that a principal lacks capacity to make health
care decisions shall be made by the attending physician to a
reasonable degree of medical certainty. The determination
shall be stated in writing and shall contain the attending
physician's opinion regarding the cause and nature of the
principal's incapacity as well as its extent and probable
duration.
(b) If the attending physician determines that a patient lacks
capacity because of mental illness or developmental disability,
the attending physician who makes the determination must
have, or must consult with a health care professional who has,
specialized training or experience in diagnosing or treating
mental illnesses or developmental disabilities of the same or
similar nature.
(c) A physician who has been appointed as a patient's agent shall
not make the determination of the patient's capacity to make
health care decisions.
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Notice of a determination that a

principal lacks capacity to make health care decisions shall promptly
be given: (a) to the principal, orally and in writing, where there is
any indication of the principal's ability to comprehend such notice;
(b) to the agent; and (c) if the patient is in or is transferred from
a mental hygiene facility, to the facility director.
3. Limitedpurpose of detennination. A determination made pursuant

to this section that a principal lacks capacity to make health care
decisions is solely for the purpose of empowering an agent to
make health care decisions pursuant to a health care proxy.
4. Priority of princial's decision. Notwithstanding a determination

pursuant to this section that the principal lacks capacity to make
health care decisions, where a principal objects to a health care
decision made by an agent, the principal's decision shall prevail
unless the principal is determined to lack capacity to make health
care decisions by court order.
5. Effect of recovery of capacity. In the event the attending physician

determines that the principal has regained capacity:
(a) the authority of the agent shall cease, but shall recommence
if the principal subsequently loses capacity; and
(b) the principal's consent for treatment shall be required.
§ 5. Provider's Obligation.
1. Duty to insert proxy in medical record.

A physician who is

provided with a health care proxy shall arrange for the proxy or a
copy thereof to be inserted in the principal's medical record.
2. Duty to honor agent's decision. A health care provider shall

comply with health care decisions made by an agent under a health
care proxy to the same extent as if such decisions had been made
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by the principal, subject to any limitations in the health care proxy
and to the provisions of section 4.4 of this article.
§ 6. Revocation.
1. Means of revoking proxy.
(a) A competent adult may revoke a health care proxy by
notifying the agent or a health care provider orally or in
writing or by any other act evidencing a specific intent to
revoke the proxy.
(b) For the purpose of this section, every adult shall be presumed
competent unless determined otherwise pursuant to court
order.
(c) A health care proxy shall also be revoked upon:
(i)

execution by the principal of a subsequent health care
proxy; or

(ii)

the divorce or legal separation of the principal and
spouse, where the spouse is the principal's agent under
a health care proxy.

2. Duly to record revocation. A physician who is informed of or
provided with a revocation of a health care proxy shall
immediately: (i) record the revocation in the principal's medical
record and (ii) notify the agent and the medical staff responsible
for the principal's care of the revocation. Any member of the
nursing staff informed of or provided with a revocation of a
health care proxy pursuant to this section shall immediately notify
a physician of such revocation.
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§ 7. Immunity.
1. Provider bmunity. No health care provider or employee thereof
shall be subjected to criminal or civil liability, or be deemed to
have engaged in unprofessional conduct, for carrying out in good
faith a health care decision by an agent pursuant to this article.
2. Agent immuniy. No person acting as agent pursuant to a health
care proxy shall be subjected to criminal or civil liability for
making a health care decision in good faith pursuant to this
article.

§ & Liability for Health Care Costs.
Liability for the cost of health care provided pursuant to an
agent's decision shall be the same as if the health care were
provided pursuant to the principal's decision.

§ 9. Requiring or Prohibiting Execution of Health Care Proxy.
A person may not require or prohibit the execution of a health
care proxy by an individual as a condition for providing health
care services or insurance to such individual.

§ 10. Proxies Executed in Other States.
Nothing herein shall limit the enforceability of a health care proxy
or similar instrument executed in another state or jurisdiction in
compliance with the law of that state or jurisdiction.

§ 11. Creation and Use of Proxies in Residential Health Care and
Mental Hygiene Facilities.
Residential health care facilities and mental hygiene facilities shall
establish procedures:
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(a) to provide information to residents about their right to create
a health care proxy under this article;
(b) to educate residents about the authority delegated under a
health care proxy and how a proxy is created; and
(c) to ensure that each resident who creates a proxy while residing
at the facility: (i) does so voluntarily; and (ii) understands the
health care proxy, including the scope of authority that may
be delegated, the benefits and risks of creating the proxy, and
the opportunity to provide specific instructions to the agent in
the proxy.
Such procedures shall be established in accordance with
regulations issued by the Commissioners of Health, Mental Health,
and Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities for
facilities subject to their respective regulatory authorities.
§ 12. Regulations
The Commissioner of Health shall establish such regulations as
may be necessary for the implementation of this article, subject
to section 11 of this article.
§ 13. Rights to be Publicized
The Commissioner of Health shall prepare a statement
summarizing the rights, duties and requirements of this article and
shall require that a copy of such statement (a) is furnished to
patients or their families at or prior to the time of admission to
a hospital, and to each member of the hospital's staff; and (b) is
posted in a public place in each hospital. The statement of rights
required by this section may be included in any other statement
of patients' rights required by other provisions of the Public
Health Law.
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Appendix to Legislation
Health Care Proxy
Information about the Health Care Proxy
This is an important legal document. Before signing this document,
it is vital for you to understand the following facts:
This document gives the person you name as your agent the
authority to make any and all health care decisions for you, except
to the extent you state otherwise in this document. "Health care"
means any treatment, service or procedure to diagnose or treat your
physicial or mental condition. Your agent therefore can have the
power to make a broad range of health care decisions for you,
including decisions about withdrawing or withholding life-sustaining
treatment.
Your agent's authority will begin when your physician determines
that you lack capacity to make health care decisions. You will be
informed of this determination when it is made and will have an
opportunity to object and assert your right to make health care
decisions on your own behalf.
You may state in this document any treatment that you do not
desire and/or those that you want to make sure you receive. Your
agent will be obligated to follow your instructions when making
decisions on your behalf.
Examples of medical treatments about which you may wish to give
your agent special instructions are:
* artificial respiration
" artificial nutrition and hydration (nourishment provided by feeding
tube)
• cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR)
" antibiotics
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dialysis
transplantation
blood transfusions
abortion
sterilization
antipsychotic medication
electroconvulsive therapy
psychosurgery
other treatments

Unless you state otherwise, your agent will have the same authority
to make decisions about these treatments as you would have had.
This is not, however, a complete list of the treatments about which
you may leave instructions. Nor does the list mean that you, and
consequently your agent, can legally refuse these treatments under
all circumstances. It is important that you discuss this document with
your physician or another health care professional before you sign
it to make sure that you understand the nature and range of
decisions that may be made on your behalf. You may also wish to
give your physician a signed copy. You do not need a lawyer's
assistance to complete this document.
The person you appoint as agent must be over eighteen years old.
If you appoint a physician as your agent, he or she may have to
choose between acting as your agent or as your attending physician;
the law does not permit a physician to do both at the same time.
Also, if you are a patient or resident of a hospital, nursing home
or mental hygiene facility, there are special restrictions on appointing
a person who works for that facility as your agent. You should ask
the administrator or other personnel at the facility to explain those
restrictions.
You should inform the person you appoint that he or she will be
your health care agent. You should discuss this document with your
agent and give him or her a signed copy. Your agent will not be
liable for health care decisions made in good faith on your behalf.

JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS

[VOL VI

Even after you have signed this document, you have the right to
make health care decisions for yourself as long as you are able to
do so, and treatment cannot be given to you or stopped over your
objection. You have the right to revoke the authority granted to
your agent by informing him or her or your health care provider
orally or in writing.
Instructions for Completing the Health Care Proxy
Item (1):Insert your name (i.e., the name of person who is
appointing a health care agent) and the name, home address and
telephone number of the agent.
Item (2):If you have special instructions for your agent, you should
state them here. Also, if you wish to limit your agent's authority in
any way, you should state so here. If you do not state any
limitations, your agent will have authority to make any and all health
care decisions on your behalf that you could have made, including
the authority to consent to or refuse life-sustaining treatment.
Item (3):You may, if you wish, insert the name, home address and
telephone number of an alternate agent.
Item (4):You must date and sign the proxy. If you are unable to
sign yourself, you may direct someone else to sign in your presence.
Be sure to include your address.
Item (5):Two witnesses 18 years of age or older must sign your
proxy. The person who is appointed agent cannot act as a witness.
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Health Care Proxy Form
(1)

I,

, hereby appoint
Name of principal

,
Name of agent

, as my health care agent to make any
Home address and telephone number of agent

and all health care decisions for me, except to the extent I provide otherwise in this
document.
This health care proxy shall take effect in the event I become unable to make my own
health care decisions, as determined by the physician who has primary responsibility for
my treatment.
(2) I direct my agent to make health care decisions in accordance with my wishes as stated
below or as otherwise known to him or her.
Statement of wishes concerning health care:

(3)

IMPORTANT: For examples of medical treatments that you may wish to give your agent
instructions about, see "Information about the Health Care Proxy," at the beginning of
this form.
In the event the person I appoint above is unable, unwilling or unavailable to act as my
health care agent, I hereby appoint

Name of alternate agent
Home address and telephone

as my health care agent.
(4)

Signed this _

day of

,

.

Signature:
Address:
(5) 1 declare that the person who signed or asked another to sign this document is personally
known to me, that he or she signed or asked another to sign this document in my
presence, and that he or she appears to be of sound mind and under no duress, fraud,
or undue influence. I am not the person appointed as agent by this document.
First Witness:
Address:
Second Witness:
A AA-.~

